by Laurence Garey
- A short history of the conflicts
- The role of the Venom fighter-bomber in the Jebel Akhdar conflict
- Crash site of a Venom on Saiq Plateau
Many people coming to live and work in the UAE or Oman hear of
the so-called Buraimi and Jebel Akhdar conflicts of the 1950s. So
many variants of the story exist that I thought it of interest to
summarise what I have learned of these events, and particularly
of some of the remnants and reminders of those bloody days that
can still be seen. I should be pleased to receive comments and
corrections to my version.
A short history of the conflicts (1,2)
In the 1950s life in Oman was primitive and poor. Roads, hospitals
and schools were virtually nonexistent. Many Omanis were
illiterate and in poor health, but would defend their
independence against any aggression. The geography of Oman
divided an outward-looking society of merchants and seamen along
the coast from an inward-looking, conservative, society in the
interior.
From 1932 to 1970 the ruler was Sultan Said bin Taimur Al Bu
Said. Although the absolute ruler of Oman, religious factors and
tribal loyalties limited his power. The tradition in central Oman
was that a leader, the Imam, must be elected from among the
people. This occasioned numerous confrontations between the
coastal based Sultans and conservative Imams of the interior. In
1920 the Imam concluded the Treaty of Seeb (a town near Muscat,
see Map 1) with the Sultan. It established the Sultan as
paramount, and consolidated his control of foreign affairs. It
also recognised a measure of autonomy for the tribal leaders
including the right to adjudicate their internal affairs and
elect their Imam. The treaty brought peace between Muscat and
Oman that lasted from 1920 until the 1950s, when the impact of
anti-colonialism and oil prospection inflamed traditional, tribal
values.
In the early 1950s ARAMCO, a Saudi-American oil company, believed
that oil existed in commercial quantities near the Buraimi oasis
(Map 1). There emerged a tenuous claim that Buraimi was Saudi
territory, based on the fact that in the nineteenth century Saudi
tribes had occupied part of it. In fact their last occupation had
ended in 1869 in expulsion by the Sultan of Muscat. As Buraimi is
on their mutual border both Abu Dhabi and Oman requested that
Britain negotiate with the Saudis on their behalf. A Saudi
garrison of forty men occupied Buraimi on 31 August 1952. Sultan
Said and Imam Mohammed raised an army of 8000 tribesmen at Sohar,
in striking distance of Buraimi via Wadi Jizzi (Map 1). An
agreement was reached between the Saudi and British governments;
the Sultan was persuaded not to take military action and the army
dispersed. The Saudi garrison remained in Buraimi, surrounded by
the Trucial Oman Levies, a small local army with British
officers, designed to keep the peace in the Trucial States, that
later formed the United Arab Emirates. During this siege, the
Levies were believed to be selling their ammunition to the
Saudis, so the Levies’ commander intervened. As his Land Rover
approached the blockade it was fired upon by the Levies who
killed him and two others.
In August 1954, an international tribunal in Geneva decided to allow
detachments of Saudi police and Trucial Oman Levies into Buraimi.
In September 1955, the British walked out of the Geneva
negotiations and, in a reversal of policy, encouraged the Sultan
of Oman and the ruler of Abu Dhabi to occupy Buraimi. What the
Sultan had wanted to do in 1952, he was ordered to do in 1955.
The Levies rounded up the Saudi police, installed the Sultan's
Wali in Buraimi Fort (Figure 1), and invited a detachment of the
Sultan’s Army to occupy Buraimi. To regain the town as a gift
from the British rather than by force of arms must have
compromised the Sultan's prestige. Had the Sultan been permitted
to expel the Saudis in 1952, the country might have been spared a
bitter rebellion a few years later.
The use of bombers of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in Oman began
with some Avro Lincolns (Figure 2) of 7 Squadron that flew low
over the Buraimi area in 1955, to show how seriously Britain took
the situation (2). The Lincoln was a development of the
well-known Lancaster of World War Two vintage, a four-engined
heavy bomber that made an incredible noise when flown at low
level. It must have intimidated the occupiers of Buraimi to a not
inconsiderable extent.
The years from 1952 and 1955 were bad years for the Sultan. The
Saudis provided money and arms to the tribes of the interior with
the intent of undermining his influence. In 1954 the much
respected Imam Mohammed died and was succeeded by Ghalib bin Ali
al Hinai, believed by many to be a result of Saudi interference.
He was supported by his brother Talib, the Wali of Rustaq, and
Suleiman bin Himyar, self-styled Lord of the Jebel Akhdar (Map
1). Relations between the Sultan and Ghalib worsened over rights
to grant oil concessions. A subsidiary of the Iraq Petroleum
Company wished to prospect near Fahud (Map 1). The Sultan claimed
that dealings with the oil company were his prerogative, but
Ghalib claimed that the oil was in his territory, so it was an
internal matter and his prerogative. The Sultan licensed oil
prospectors to search at Fahud, supported by Britain, but Ghalib
attacked, and declared independence for the State of Oman. In
response, in October 1955 the Sultan’s Muscat and Oman Field
Force marched north from Fahud to occupy Ibri, then under the
Imam's control, to cut him off from Saudi support. Ghalib moved
to expel the Sultan's forces from Ibri, but by Bahla (Figure 3)
had received no support from Suleiman bin Himyar, and so
retreated to Nizwa (Map 1). The Sultan then captured Bahla and
Nizwa successively without firing a shot. Two days later, on
December 15, 1955, the Sultan’s Batinah Force captured Rustaq
fort (Figure 4), after determined resistance from Talib, the
Imam's brother, who escaped. When his forces had occupied the
rebel strongholds, the Sultan drove from his southern capital in Salalah in a remarkable 900km trek across the desert to Nizwa to
accept the surrender of the rebels. He rescinded the Treaty of
Seeb and abolished the office of Imam. Ghalib acknowledged the
sovereignty of the Sultan, abdicated and returned to his village
of Bilad Sait (Map 2). Suleiman pledged loyalty to the Sultan
and, humiliated, retired to his village of Tanuf (Map 2,
Figure
5).
Talib escaped to Saudi Arabia and during 1956 and 1957 trained a
liberation army of Omani expatriates. Talib designated Ibrahim
bin Issa to lead the rebellion. In March 1957, Ibrahim, with his
followers, returned to Oman. In early June the Sultan invited
Ibrahim to Muscat for discussions, but upon arrival he was
clapped in the terrifying prison of Jelali Fort. On 14 June 1957
Talib landed at Suwaiq on the Batinah Coast (Map 1) with 100 men
while another 100 landed north of Sohar. Talib proceeded inland
to his village at Bilad Sait where brother Ghalib, who had been
living there peacefully, was persuaded to reassume the title of
Imam. Suleiman joined the rebels which meant that the whole of
Jebel Akhdar and its foothills were in revolt. Men of the
Sultan's Oman Regiment drove in their Land Rovers to arrest
Talib, but were trapped near Bilad Sait. Their vehicles were
ambushed and destroyed in a battle that raged for a week. Only a
few, including all their British officers, managed to fight their
way out. They made for the oil camp at Fahud, 120km away, where
they were disbanded. The Imam's white flag again flew over his
capital of Nizwa, surrendered without a fight. As the Sultan's
Oman Regiment was fighting for survival near Bilad Sait, Sayyid
Tarik, the Sultan's half brother and viceroy of the interior,
left Al Hamra (Map 2) with a small force. He was attacked near Tanuf but escaped. At Izki Suleiman ambushed the survivors
heading for Muscat causing additional casualties.
On 16 July 1957, the Sultan requested British assistance, referring
to a treaty between the United Kingdom and Oman in 1951. The
Sultan's army was extremely weak, consisting of the Muscat
Regiment of 120 men, the Batinah Force of 200 men, and the Oman
Regiment of 300 men.
After the Suez catastrophe, Britain was subject to hostile
scrutiny, particularly by Russia and a coalition of Egypt, Syria
and Yemen. It was potentially politically dangerous, but Britain
responded positively for a number of reasons. These included the
RAF base on Masirah Island, further south along the Omani coast
between Muscat and Salalah, and the hope that the Sultan would
favour British oil and commercial interests. Also, to refuse the
Sultan would question British presence along the whole coast from
Aden to the Persian Gulf. But Britain's assistance was given on
condition that Oman accept to change the worst aspects of the
Sultan's government and agree to further British presence.
Britain immediately provided a company of Trucial Oman Scouts
(the former Trucial Oman Levies). Soon after, three companies of
Cameronians and a troop of Hussars arrived. The initial British
reaction was air attack. First, the RAF bombed the Jebel Akhdar
plateau using 1000 pound bombs from Shackleton bombers from
Khormaksar, Aden, but it was largely ineffective as the orders
were to bomb caves (Figure 6) and water systems, not villages.
The Shackleton bomber (Figure 7) was the final derivative of the
Lancaster/Lincoln family. It was also a large four-engined heavy
bomber, designed for maritime support and anti-submarine bombing.
Shackleton MR2 (for maritime reconnaissance) bombers of 37 and 42
Squadrons were used on Jebel Akhdar in 1957 and 1958, flying from
their bases in Aden, Bahrain, Sharjah (Map 1) and Masirah. The
first detachment was when half of 42 Squadron from St Eval in
Cornwall arrived in Aden in January 1957. Then, in June, five
more arrived in Aden from 37 Squadron in Malta, and took up
residence there. Those of 42 Squadron moved on to Bahrain. In
1958, 228 Squadron moved into Sharjah, and later Masirah, and on
1 January 1959 two 224 Squadron Shackletons arrived there from
Gibraltar. Altogether, the Shackletons flew 429 sorties and
dropped 1540 tons of bombs during the Jebel Akhdar campaign (2).
Later, Venom fighters (Figure 8) (see below: The role of
the Venom fighter-bomber in the Jebel Akhdar conflict)
based in Sharjah attacked targets with rocket and cannon fire.
The rockets did little damage to the solid rock of the great fort
at Nizwa (Figure 9) nor even the mud walls of the smaller forts.
Since the Imam's flag was white, many pilots did not engage
legitimate targets because they believed the flag indicated
surrender. Reliance on air power reflected British policy in the
region since the 1930s. Aircraft were expected to interrupt
normal life so much that a revolt would end rapidly.
Top priority was the recapture of Nizwa, the Imam's capital. A
force was sent to Nizwa through the Sumail Gap (Map 2). It was
joined by tribesmen who hoped to take over the villages of
Suleiman and Talib. The column encountered rebels near Mutti (Map
2). Two Venoms were called in. They did not fire on the first
pass and the rebels cheered derisively. On the next pass cannon
fire ended the laughter and the rebels fled into the hills. On 6
August 1957 another force of Hussars, Cameronians and Trucial
Oman Scouts advanced from Fahud to Nizwa. While advancing on Firq
(Map 2), the Scouts came under rebel fire. Even with the
assistance of Venoms and the fire of machine guns and mortars,
they were unable to advance. During the night of 10 August 1957
patrols of Hussars probed the enemy positions and discovered that
the rebels held not only Firq but also the lower slopes of a hill
to the southeast. The Venoms strafed the rebels the next day,
after which the Cameronians seized the hill in a night attack and
were in position to support the Scouts in a dawn attack. The plan
was carried out with minimum casualties. The two forces met at
Birkat al Mauz (Map 2), 12km east of Nizwa, on 12 August 1957 and
soon occupied Nizwa.
Sayyid Tarik, the Sultan's half brother, took up residence in
Nizwa Fort and controlled sources of information loyal to the
Sultan; he provided the best guides and interpreters. Talib, Imam
Ghalib, and Suleiman fled into the Jebel Akhdar. So the Sultan's
forces controlled the land around the jebel and the rebels
controlled the apparently impregnable heights.
Jebel Akhdar forms a high plateau measuring about 20km from north
to south and 30km from east to west (Figure 10). Its average
elevation is about 2000m and it is surrounded by cliffs rising to
3000m. Since many of the cliffs are almost vertical, the tracks
to the top could be easily defended by the rebels. Stores and
weapons, including machine guns, mortars, ammunition and radios,
were shipped from Saudi Arabia by sea to Sharjah, then overland
to the Batinah Coast, and then onwards to Rustaq and Awabi (Map
1), and finally carried to the high plateau of Jebel Akhdar. As
the rebels got stronger, they left the plateau more and more
frequently to lay mines in the wadis used by the Sultan's
soldiers. Over 150 vehicles were destroyed between March and
November 1958. In April 1958, in an attempt to force the rebels
into the open, soldiers advanced ostentatiously up the jebel
during the day hoping to convince the rebels that they intended
to spend the night on its slopes. However, during the night they
began to withdraw quietly, expecting the rebels to attack at
dawn, when the RAF had been instructed to drop 1000-pound bombs
on them. Unfortunately, the retreat proved more difficult than
expected, so when four Shackletons from Masirah each dropped
fifteen 1000-pounders, followed by four Venoms shooting at
anything and everything, the Sultan's soldiers watched from
below, only just out of range, while the rebel soldiers, who had
not fallen into the trap, watched the display from above.
Colonel David Smiley was appointed commander of the Sultan’s
forces, which he found to be in poor shape. They consisted of the
Northern Frontier Regiment of 450 men including 8 Royal Marines,
the Muscat Regiment of 250 men, Trucial Oman Scouts at Ibri and
Izki (Map 1), and a troop of Hussars. Radio Cairo attributed
British strength at between ten and twenty thousand. The rebel
mining campaign had become increasingly effective. Two or three
vehicles were being blown up every day. The priority of the
Sultan's forces was to isolate the rebels from their source of
supply. A major source of arms for the enemy had been British war
material lost at the Suez Canal. Britain attempted to persuade
the United States to stop supplying mines to Saudi Arabia, but
the alleged response was that they were part of an assistance programme and how they were used was of no concern to the
supplier. The army attempted to blockade the jebel by guarding
the base of every known track. On October 6, 1958, the Northern
Frontier Regiment occupied Tanuf and a squadron of the Trucial
Oman Scouts occupied Yanqul (Map 1) at the northwest end of the
Hajar Range closing the last major supply route from Saudi
Arabia. During the second week of November 1958, a patrol of the
Muscat Regiment found an unguarded route to the top of the jebel,
after a six-hour climb from Hajar, above Awabi (Map 2). On the
seaward side there were few routes to the plateau, with only two
or three accessible paths. Awabi lay where two routes through the
hills met. This discovery allowed the Sultan's forces to reach
the plateau, but the top of the Awabi track was on the opposite
side of the plateau, about 30km from the rebel stronghold in the
vicinity of Saiq (Map 2).
One day a woman arrived in Nizwa with a message from the Imam
suggesting a truce during which both sides would refrain from
hostilities. For two weeks the skies were clear of Shackletons
and Venoms, and the guns were silent. The rebels’ terms proved
unacceptable to the Sultan, and the war resumed. Convinced that
the rebels could not be defeated in the foreseeable future with
the forces available, Smiley went to Sharjah on 13 June 1958 to
meet Christopher Soames, Secretary of State for War, to ask for
more British assistance. The Foreign Office objected to official
use of British troops because of repercussions in the United
Nations where Saudi Arabia and Egypt were denouncing British
intervention in Oman. However, it was suggested that the Special
Air Service (SAS) might be used discretely. The commander of the
SAS, Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Deane-Drummond travelled to
Muscat from Sharjah to confer with Smiley. A squadron of eighty
SAS men was flown to Masirah Island. They were picked up by RAF
aircraft from Aden and flown to a dirt strip at Azaiba (Map 2),
arriving at Bait al Falaj, headquarters of the Sultan's Armed
Forces, on 20 November 1958. The SAS patrolled from Tanuf and
Awabi, providing valuable information on rebel movements. There
was evidence of treachery, with one "friendly" tribal leader who
was in charge of anti-mining found to be setting mines himself.
Following this introduction to war on the jebel, it was concluded
that RAF bombing of the plateau was counter-productive and it was
discontinued. However, Venoms from Sharjah still flew over the
jebel at dawn to provide covering fire for SAS patrols. This air
support was so close that some soldiers were injured by falling
shell casings from aircraft cannon.
During December 1958, the SAS killed between twenty and thirty of
the enemy at a cost of one killed. The rebellion was expected to
end in a few months by a process of attrition. It was believed
that as Talib's men were killed, he would take an increasingly
active role himself, with a higher risk that he would be killed.
A headquarters was established near Nizwa and Smiley delegated
tactical command of all forces operating against the rebels to
Deane-Drummond.
Because of the April 1959 deadline for the withdrawal of British
troops, only three months were available to end the war. A night
attack on the jebel during full moon was decided on. The primary
objective was to establish a foothold on the plateau near the
rebel strongholds at Saiq, Bani Habib, and Sharaijah (Map 3,
Figures 11, 12). A small base was established near the head of
the unguarded track to the plateau on the north of the jebel, but
the enemy cut off that access. The shortest routes on the south
side were the well-guarded tracks from Tanuf and Kamah (Map 2),
but aerial reconnaissance revealed another route, a sloping ridge
east of Wadi Kamah. It was unguarded and the commanders thought
that it could be climbed in one night. No maps existed other
than one very crude drawing, so they invented code names for key
features on the route. The top was Beercan, the first peak
Pyramid, a ridge between two slopes Causeway, a crest about a
third of the way up Vincent, and a peak beyond Beercan
overlooking Bani Habib was Colin; a summit in the form of two
rounded peaks was Sabrina (Map 2)! The SAS would lead the assault
and push on to Bani Habib, Saiq, and Sharaijah. Other units
would open up the track from Kamah for donkey columns to bring up
supplies. In the south, fifty local tribesmen would accompany the
SAS. In the north, two hundred more would climb the jebel from
Awabi. The death or capture of Talib, Ghalib and Suleiman were of
extreme importance (3). In order to confuse the rebels, several
diversions were planned. Between 8 and 22 January 1959, patrols
from Tanuf drove the rebels from an observation post. Others
patrolled on the north side of the jebel and yet more pushed from
Izki into Wadi Muaydin. The night of 25 January 1959 was chosen
for the attack, which was to occupy Vincent, Pyramid, Beercan,
and Colin before dawn. A troop of SAS left Tanuf by truck to
Wadi Kamah. They had to climb the mountain before first light
without forfeiting the element of surprise. The enemy had about
250 soldiers backed by up to 1000 armed tribesmen. Their arms
included rifles, machine guns, mortars, and mines. The leading
unit reached the summit before first light after a climb of nine
and a half hours and occupied Beercan, Colin, and Bani Habib. The
only sign of enemy activity was twenty tribesmen who surrendered.
At dawn Venoms from Sharjah appeared over the plateau to provide
support if needed. Three RAF Valetta (Figure 13) transports from
Bahrain dropped supplies on Beercan. With the surrender of
Sharaijah, the Jebel Akhdar War ended. The SAS had suffered three
casualties in their attack. All three rebel leaders made good an
escape by sea to Saudi Arabia. The rebellion was finally snuffed
out in a three month effort after four years of futility and
failure.
Oman later faced a much more serious threat. In the 1960s the
Dhofar Rebellion, supported by the Soviet Union and China, came
close to toppling the regime. The resolution of the Jebel Akhdar
War ensured that the Sultan could concentrate his forces against
the enemy in Dhofar without concern for a rebellion in central
Oman.
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The role of the Venom fighter-bomber in the Jebel Akhdar conflict
The De Havilland Venom (4, Figure 8) was developed from the
Vampire, one of the RAF’s first jet fighters. It was a single
seat fighter-bomber, with metal wings, and a fuselage made of a
mixture of aluminium, plywood and balsawood! It had an unusual
“pod and boom” layout, with two thin booms extending back from
the wings carrying the tail. It had a single De Havilland Ghost
engine of 4850 pounds thrust (Figure 14). The first Venom flew on
2 September 1949, and this first version was given the mark
number FB1 (for fighter-bomber). It entered RAF service in 1952.
374 of them were built in the UK (plus 50 of a version for
export), and 150 were made in Switzerland. The other
fighter-bomber version was the FB4, first flown on 29 December
1953, and in service with the RAF from 1955 to 1962. In England,
172 were produced, and again 100 were built in Switzerland
(Figure 15). These were the last Venoms in service, and were
finally retired from front-line service in 1983. Several still
fly in civilian hands today (Figure 16). The RAF's single-seat
Venoms were operated exclusively overseas, equipping the Far East
and Middle East Air Forces as well as the 2nd Tactical Air Force
in Germany. The Venom carried four 20mm cannon and up to eight 60
pound rockets. It had underwing points for either two 1000 pound
bombs or external fuel tanks. In view of the distance from
Sharjah, and to allow at least some time over target, the Venoms
in this campaign never used bombs, as the points always carried
fuel tanks (2, Figures 8,
17).
On 20 July 1957 four Venoms of 8 Squadron flew from Aden to the RAF
Station at Sharjah. The day after their arrival, the Venom pilots
were flying in Shackletons to see the area they would be
operating in (2). The next two days were spent flying the Venoms,
accompanied by Shackletons, over Izki and Nizwa, where leaflets
were dropped to warn the population about impending attacks.
Dropping leaflets from the big Shackleton was not too difficult,
but for the Venoms they had to be stored in the flaps (control
surfaces under the wings) from where they would fall out when the
flaps were lowered. On 27 July 1957 the Venoms attacked Izki,
Nizwa and Tanuf. The same day 6 Venoms of 249 Squadron arrived at
Sharjah from Nairobi. Both resident squadrons then attacked the
fort at Birkat al Mauz the next day. Over the next week Firq,
Nizwa and Bahla Forts came under fire from the Venoms. 8 Squadron
returned to Aden a month later, only to fly back to Sharjah from
October to November 1957. The Operations Record Book for 8
Squadron for November 1957 mentions sorties “to destroy Bani al
Habib” (5). The squadron was back again for various detachments
throughout 1958, finally leaving Sharjah on 3 October 1958. The
pilots found life difficult at RAF Sharjah (2). The runway was
hard sand, which blew up clouds of stinging dust as each aircraft
took off. The accommodation and other facilities were bad. It is
still possible to see parts of RAF Sharjah to this day. Some of
the buildings of the old fort are used as the Mahatta Museum, and
the control tower still exists. The runway is now covered by a
main road in the centre of the town! For whatever reason the
Venom squadrons suffered many accidents, and stories abound of
the number of wrecked aircraft that could be seen around the
airfield in the late 1950s. Altogether 8 Squadron Venoms flew
1315 sorties, and 249 Squadron flew 163 sorties. They fired 3718
rockets and 271,060 20mm shells (2).
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Crash site of a Venom on Saiq Plateau
On 30 August 1958 a Venom failed to return to its base at Sharjah.
The Sultan's forces sent a woman, since women could not be
stopped or searched by either side, to enquire about the pilot.
She reported that the aircraft had crashed and that the pilot had
died. I knew that there was supposed to be a remnant of the Jebel
Akhdar War in the form of a crashed RAF fighter-bomber, that I
supposed was the aircraft that had crashed in 1958, but its exact
location remained a mystery to me. The weekend of 15-17 October
2003 we visited Jebel Akhdar to try to find the site.
All the way up the 40km of track (that varies from good, through bad to very bad)
from the valley we saw no sign of the Venom. At the hotel that
stands atop the plateau I asked the manager. He said that, yes,
he knew where the crashed plane was. In fact it was only about 3
km from the hotel. The fact that he called it a helicopter
worried me!
Next day we searched the area around the main village of the plateau, Saiq
(Map 3). As described above, the 1000 pound bombs dropped by the
Shackletons and the rockets fired by the Venoms proved rather
ineffective (bombs and rockets do not do a lot a damage against
sheer mountain sides), but there must have been nasty "collateral
damage". Villagers in the Saiq area still tell stories of the
bombing by the “Americans”, and visitors may be shown evidence of
craters that mark demolished homes (6). Indeed, many of the
houses in the village of Bani Habib show signs of damage that
could bear witness to bombing (Figure 18), being quite close to
obvious caves (the purported targets) in the mountain sides
(Figure 6), although we cannot prove that conclusion.
Interestingly, during one of our treks, to the tiny village of Al
Ain near Saiq, we came across a basin shaped piece of heavy steel
casing with a tight screw-thread at one end, which I interpreted
as being a piece of a 1000 pounder (Figure 19). It will be
remembered from the historical account above that Saiq, Bani
Habib and nearby Sharaijah were indeed all considered as rebel
strongholds.
We found the Venom, just by the roadside near Sharaijah (Figures 20,
21,
22), at GPS coordinates N23 04’33.4, E57 39’36.4 (there is, in
fact, a much more modern wreck, of a Huey helicopter, at an army
base a kilometer or so further on). Of our Venom, only the
engine, the central parts of the wings (with the main wheels
still retracted in them Figure 23), and part of the fuselage
remain. None of these parts carry the RAF serial number (it would
have been under the outer wing panels and on the booms, which had
presumably been recycled long before by locals), so I could not
determine the precise identity of the plane on site, but it was
certainly a Venom, as was also attested by the relatively
well-preserved engine (Figure 24).
There were lots of serial numbers on
individual components, which I duly photographed, in the hope
that British Aerospace (the company that took over the former De
Havillands) would help me in further identification (Figures 25,
26). Pencilled on the inside of a torn panel was the number "562"
(Figure 27). Now, RAF records (7,8) tell us that a Venom of the
British Forces in the Aden Protectorate, serial number WR562,
crashed on 10 August 1957. I thought that this could be it,
although the date did not correspond! However, the penciled “562”
seems not to refer to WR562. That aircraft is
reported to have crashed in Aden, not Oman. Indeed, closer
inspection of the wreckage revealed the number “DHE562” penciled
in small script, but apparently in the same handwriting, on the
turbine casing at the rear of the engine (Figure 28). This could
refer to a “De Havilland Engines” serial. Records of RAF serials
mention another Venom FB4 (WR552) of 8 Squadron that went down on
30/8/1958, having been delivered new to the RAF in December 1955
(3,10). Colin Richardson, author of the excellent book
Masirah, Tales from a Desert Island (2) confirmed that fact
in a letter to me in December 2003. He was a former Venom pilot
on 8 Squadron himself, and a friend of Flight Lieutenant Owen
Watkinson, the pilot, flying from Sharjah. So the search for our
Venom’s identity concluded successfully. It is said that the
pilot was strafing goats, and it is thought that he was not shot
down, but misjudged the pull out from his attacking dive.
Alongside the wreck is a small stone cairn (Figure 29), marking
the grave of Owen Watkinson, who was buried under a pile of rocks
immediately after the crash by local people, and later
re-interred in the rock ledge that is surmounted by the cairn to
this day. After the Jebel Akhdar war an RAF padre conducted a
formal burial service (2) and the Bishop of Rochester later
visited and blessed the grave (9).
After fruitless enquiries of the RAF, the Ministry of Defence,
and British Aerospace, I turned to the National Archives (Public
Records Office) in London, to get a little further with the
research. I had very helpful replies from them, but I needed to
go to London to consult the documents. It was fascinating, and
frightening, to read original ministerial documents planning the
details of the Jebel Akhdar campaign and stating that the killing
of the rebel leaders was a priority (3). Also, the Operations
Record Books of 8 Squadron (5) for the period were instructive,
giving details of various sorties by their Venoms against the
rebels in the various towns mentioned above. Further afield,
their operations in Aden, for instance, at one stage accounted
for “600 goats, 8 camels, 2 cows and one man”. To my surprise,
however, I could find no reference to the accident flight of Owen
Watkinson, although there was a record of his having left the
squadron, “deceased”.
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Bibliography
(1) Meagher, JB (1985) The Jebel Akhdar War, Oman 1954-1959.
Quantico, Virginia: Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
(2) Richardson, C (2003) Masirah, Tales from a Desert Island.
Lancaster: Scotforth Books
(3) National Archives, Public Records Office, UK: AIR 8, AIR 20
(4)
www.britishaircraft.co.uk/aircraftpage.php?ID=51
(5) National Archives, Public Records Office, UK: AIR 27 (Operational Record Books)
(6) Turner, M (2004) Personal communication
(7) www.scramble.nl/combined/sb/stoffer.htm
(8) www.ukserials.fsnet.co.uk/wr.pdf
(9) Hellyer, P (2004) personal communication
Acknowledgements
Many people helped with the research in this report by giving
advice or adding personal knowledge, especially:
David Insall, Oman Historical Association
Les Kirkham, Al Ain
Tom McGhee, www.ukserials.com
Richard Owens, Anglo-Omani Society, UK
Brigadier Hugh Willing, British Defence Attaché, Oman
Staff of the Reader Information Services Department, National Archives, UK
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