Notes on the Evolution of a Traditional Cultural Sport
by Sulayman Khalaf
The following article appeared in the 1999
edition of Anthropos pp 85 -106
- Abstract
- 1. An Emiri Introduction
- From Camel to Truck
- From Truck to Camel Again
- Continuity and Change in Camel Racing
- 2. Modern Media Information Aspects
- 3. Organizational Development Aspects
- The Racetracks
- The Introduction of Different Races for Different Breeds
of hejin
- The Introduction of Different Distances for Various
Age-Groups
- Organization of Races According to Types of Owners
- Feeding and Management
- The Training of Racing Camels
- 4. The Economico-Political Aspects
- Salaries and Wages
- Selling and Buying Racing Camels
- Camel Markets
- Marketing and Advertising
- 5. The Politico-Cultural Aspects
- 6. Conclusion: Aspects of Local/Global Dynamics
- Footnotes
- References Cited
Abstract: The paper offers an ethnographic
documentation of camel racing as a growing traditional cultural heritage sport
in contemporary Gulf Arab societies. An integrated anthropological approach is
used in describing and analyzing the multiple aspects and functions of the races
as an evolving cultural revival within the broad contexts of oil wealth, the
building of modem nation-state, and modem global forces. Camel racing is
analyzed as an activity for distributing oil wealth among the Bedu segment of
the United Arab Emirates national population, as a significant component in the
enterprise of statecraft and state formation, and as cultural festivals for
preserving and promoting national cultural identity which appears threatened by
multiple global cultural flows and dynamics. [United Arab Emirates Society,
Bedouin culture in the Gulf; cultural revival, Middle Eastern popular culture
and oil, sociocultural change.
Sulayman Khalaf, M. A. (1975, American University of Beirut), Ph. D.
(1981, University of California, Los Angeles), Associate Prof. of Anthropology
at United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain. Publications: numerous articles (in
English, and Arabic) on tribal peasant communities in Syria, and on
sociocultural change in contemporary Gulf Arab societies.
Return to Index
The dawn of the great transformation in the Bedouin world is pictured for us
by the novelist Abdul Rahman Munif. One day a Bedouin Emir stood among his
fellow tribesmen of Wadi Al 'Uyoun in the Cities of Salt and said to them,
"Oh ya Ibn Rashed there are here under our own feet seas of oil, seas of
gold and al khaweya [the foreign brethren of the oil companies] have come
to dig out the oil and the gold" (Munif 1985: 87). The Emir went on to say,
"Oh people of Wadi Al 'Uyoun, you will be the richest and happiest of all
people, as if Allah sees nobody but you. You have been patient for long. Allah
is witness to that. But now you will be living a new life as if in a dream. You
will talk about your old days as if they were just stories to be told. You the
wise and senior men of Wadi Al 'Uyoun; your duty now is to facilitate the work
of our friends, and serve them with your very own eyes" (1985: 85).
Prior to the al khaweya (the foreign oil companies) uncapping the
great of oil reserves in the Gulf, the Bedu of Arabia fully utilized the camel
as "the technology" -- a la Julian Steward -- upon which they depended
for exploiting the meager and constantly changing givings of their desert
homeland. The Bedu perceived the pattern of their pastoral life as something
always changing. They viewed their world as precarious and unpredictable like
the changing clouds above them. This world view is captured in their saying,
"Ye men! Your world is like clouds, swiftly changing." Therefore, it
was no wonder that they looked to the sky in search for good pastures for their
camel herds and their own well-being. They did not think that one day, as their
Emir foresaw, they would be showered by plenty of good from underground, and not
the sky.
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The people of the Arabian Gulf have undergone rapid and profound
transformations during their own lifetime, so much so that now they indeed talk
about old times as if they were only stories to be told. During the initial
phases of the black gold rush, from the early 60s to the late 70s, the camel and
its desert ecology were swiftly neglected and marginalized. It was not easy for
traditional socioeconomic organizations based on a subsistence economy to adjust
rapidly to an entirely new economic system linked to the complex and aggressive
capitalist commercial forces of the global economy. This resulted in the
collapse of the traditional economic activities like pearling, sea-borne trade,
fishing, ship building, small-scale oasis agriculture, and pastoralism.
The old small towns and villages dotting the shores of the Gulf were
transformed into glittering cities built out of concrete, steel, and glass.
These expanding capital cities drew like powerful magnets the Bedu, who were
always ready to move where the grass was greener. Now the Bedu of the Arabian
Gulf have settled in these towns and cities to enjoy the lulling comforts of an
affluent sedentary consumer life, with extensive free welfare services and
provisions.
Within the new economic context many of the previous benefits and uses of the
camel that were essential to the Bedu pastoral way of life came to disappear
quite rapidly. In the new oil cultural ecology the camel that once was the
all-wonderful, all-purpose 4-khuf (hoot) driving machine gave way to the
Toyota 4-wheel driving machine. The fast shift from camel to truck, as Chatty
(1986) succinctly described change for the Bedu, is seen on a large scale in
contemporary Gulf societies. The camel that once was known among the Arabs as safinat
al sahra (ship of the desert) has retired from sailing across the desert
sand dunes, and now gets carried on wheels. It is a frequent sight on the
highways of Arabia to see trucks of all sizes carrying camels to various
destinations including the camel racetracks.1
An ethnographic gaze while traveling along the highway between cities in the
Gulf can provide us with further pictures depicting the marginalization of the
camel. Many of the modern highways in a country like the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) are nowadays fenced with barbed wire for hundreds of miles so as to keep
wandering camels, as it were, off the fast lanes of modern economic life. During
the initial phase of building the highways across the wide desert terrain car
accidents caused by wandering camels were fatal and alarming in their frequency.
Thus came the need to fence the highways to keep camels off and provide road
safety, particularly at night for the new Gulf man as he moved about in his
air-conditioned vehicle in the modem traffic of his new oil ecology, where the
car and the mobile phone rule supreme as the new technology in Steward's sense
of the term. 2
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The rapid marginalization of the camel experienced throughout the Gulf and
Arabia du6ng the early decades of the oil boom in the 1960s and 1970s came to be
halted in a significant way. The collapse of traditional economic activities
within the context of the overall rapid economic modernization triggered by oil
wealth brought a realization of the importance of preserving and reviving
traditional culture. The camel in general and racing camels in particular came
to be in the thick of this cultural revival phenomenon. Racing camels, known
locally as al hejin 3, are
returning in large numbers, carried by trucks from near and far throughout the
Gulf to the large- racetracks built nowadays near most major cities. As in the
UAE during the long racing season, from October to April, the slender tall hejin
become the center of attention for increasing numbers of local and foreign
enthusiasts and onlookers.4
While they perform on the track, the television screen brings this sport to
every family in the comfort of their own homes. Moreover, they bring all the
people involved in this growing industry not only cultural satisfaction and
social honor but actually large material benefits. These racing camels bring
their owners and trainers luxury four-wheelers and beautiful sedan cars such as
Mercedes and BMWs.
In anthropological/sociological research we often look into the timing of a
given phenomenon and its scale. Why is a specific phenomenon appearing at this
particular time, and why is it manifesting itself in certain magnitudes and
intensities? Over the last two decades the sport has grown at an exponential
rate: for example, 4,000 camels took part in the eight day finals of the 1996/97
camel racing season at Nad Al Shiba track in Dubai, performing in 154 rounds. A
similar number appeared on Al Wathba track in Abu Dhabi Emirate immediately
following the Dubai races.
In view of the fact that cultural revival is growing so fast as to reach
levels of national industry in the Arabian Gulf societies, the aim of my
research is to document this process as it is manifested in camel racing. In
addition to ethnographic documentation of the phenomenon in the United Arab
Emirates, other aims can be stated by a number of analytical questions that
direct our attention to explore the various dimensions surrounding the return of
the camel as a heritage revival phenomenon in the Gulf. Why is heritage revival
appearing at this time juncture as an expanding national cultural industry? How
is this cultural production being affected by rapid modernization processes that
are heavily influenced by larger globalization forces? What are the continuing
and changing aspects and elements in the reproduction of such cultural
activities? Why and how are the state and other sectors of UAE society
supporting the preservation of national heritage? What are the multifaceted
dimensions and functions of this rising heritage phenomenon in the oil rich Gulf
societies? Why is the production of the past, of cultural nostalgia,
particularly significant in the context of what Davis (1991) terms
"statecraft and state formation" in present-day Gulf societies? How is
the oil state using its wealth to develop an appropriate political discourse to
preserve national identity, strengthen its own legitimacy, and solidify its
authority structure? It is hoped that: this research topic can illuminate
further the dynamics of cultural change occurring now in the Arabian Gulf.
Providing a meaningful analytical answer to the question of why camel racing
in the UAE and the Gulf is now being practiced on a large scale requires that we
go beyond the races and heritage revival as such, and contextualize them within
the broader ongoing processes of oil economy, the building of a modem
nation-state, and increasing global forces acting on the local culture. Here we
need analytical insights gained from combining both political economy and global
cultural economy perspectives. The first can inform us about the complex
interplay between leadership, politics, culture, domination, and economic forces
or conditions. The second perspective, which has been developed recently by
globalization theorists (Appadurai 1990; Featherstone 1990; Robertson 1995) will
turn our analytical attention to the interplay, fusion and/or reactions
generated between global and local cultural dynamics as the UAE society is
undergoing rapid change.
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In the UAE, as well as other Gulf societies, heritage revival including camel
racing is reaching levels of national industry. This has involved the
mobilization of labor, capital, and integrated organization of many people,
agencies, and institutions. However, to give our ethnographic description of
camel heritage revival a historical framework, it is useful to present first a
brief sketch of camel racing in the past. This will enable us to contextualize
and appreciate the scope and complexity of the modem development of the races.
In the former pastoral way of life, the Bedu of Arabia utilized the camel in
maximal ways, not only to survive in the harsh environment in terms of food and
transport but also in raiding and numerous political activities as well as in
sport and recreation. For the Bedu it was an all-purpose 4-hoof driving machine
that was adapted and utilized in both material and symbolic cultural terrains.
Local informants explained that camel racing in the past could be viewed as
falling into two categories: races during "social celebrations" and
"competition races." In the old days such sportive recreational
activities were fully integrated within the mainstream of social economic life
of the Bedu which in general lacked the institutions of certain cultural
activities whereby numerous and elaborate rules get invented and established.
Races, which were performed on festive social occasions and celebrated by the
local community, included religious feasts, celebrating rainfall, weddings,
circumcision, and perhaps the occasional visit of a prominent tribal shaikh.
During such festive occasions people displayed their colorful rugs and cloths on
tent ropes. These races were basically an ardha, a show, which ran across
300-500 m. One or two men sang loud heroic war songs, and riders exhibited their
riding skills while brandishing their swords or old rifles, or stood holding
hands while two or three camels ran parallel to each other. When tribesmen
visited the villages or camps of their kinsmen during religious Eids, feasts,
they usually performed a short ardha race on their mounts before coming
in the tent to greet the people and share coffee and dates with them. In the
races of festive celebrations there were occasional individual competitions for
sport, but the winners received no prizes. Sometimes, however, in wedding
celebrations the first, or occasionally the first three winning camels got
prizes from the family of the groom. Prizes in those days were small symbolic
statements, basically shara (sign) or namous (recognition),
represented materially in a dagger, head cloth, or other items of clothing.
In competition races riders were usually arranged for the race a day ahead of
time, and the evening before the race they agreed on the starting point. A shara
(prize) was usually declared ahead of time. Such competitions were usually
arranged as a resu1t of a challenge (wahna) among camel owners, or it could have
been triggered by a visit of a leading shaikh who put forward a prize for the
race. Sometimes competing riders went and spent the night at the starting point.
Each would guard his mount carefully throughout the night to prevent foul play
from other competitors. The race usually started early in the morning. Racing
distances were relatively short, extending between 3 to 4 km. Unlike today,
camels sat down at the starting line, and upon hearing a short cry, they rose up
and ran. The owner of a particularly fast camel was usually asked not to
participate. Instead he was given a sadda (compensation) in order to give a
reasonable chance to other competing camels and to make the race more
unpredictable and exciting. Rules governing age categories of competing camels
and the ages and weights of riders were almost nonexistent. As recently as the
early 1970s, race camels were ridden by their owners, usually the nimble
youngsters in the family.
The advent of oil in the emirates in the early 60s did not bring about an
immediate change to camel racing. There were local races in each emirate, and
these usually preceded the larger inter-emirate races. In the Dubai local races,
for example, they sometimes ran the long distance of 15 km a1ong the beach from
Chicago Beach to Al Shindaga, or a lesser distance from Al Safa to Al Shindaga.
Usually shaikhs gave prizes to winning participants. Races in the 60s and 70s
took place in a seih, rain flood flat land as in Seih Al She'aib in Dubai, upon
which later the Dubai-Abu Dhabi highway was built. The starting point for this
race was known as al medfa' and the finishing point as al mehjel.
As noted by one informant, challenge and passion were the high excitement of
the locals, particularly in the inter-emirates races. These larger races were
always headed and patronized by the ruling shaikhly families, and the prizes
were provided by the ruling shaikh of the emirate in which the race took place.
Even in these races, rules regarding camel types, age categories or riders were
lacking. Old films of the emirates in the late 60s show footage of camel racing
where large numbers of cars follow the camels, creating dust storms and adding
to the feeling of general commotion and excitement.
The production and organization of modem camel racing in the UAE is radically
different from 30 years ago. Then the races were held occasionally in small
local communities; now the scope and depth of change has touched all aspects of
the races, so much so that they now appear beyond recognition for many old
locals. These modem developments can be delineated by an analytical description
of the different aspects which make up this still expanding heritage sport. It
should be noted that these various aspects, functions, and dynamics are all
interconnected in complex ways; they are identified here separately only for
analytical purposes.. They include the modem media, new organizational
developments, economic, political, and cultural aspects as well as aspects
related to the interplay between local and global forces.
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Modem mass media, represented by television, radio, newspapers, and magazines
is the leading agency involved in the production and propagation of heritage
revival activities in contemporary UAE society. With the broad transformation of
society came an increasing decline of traditional methods of communication.
Subsequently, television has emerged over the last 20 years to rule supreme over
all other agencies of modem communication technologies. Every year during the
long camel-racing season (October to early April), television has made the
spectacle of camel racing, as well as other types of heritage festivals, within
reach of every home.
Those who get attracted by camel races on television and venture out to the
track to see performances in reality are caught in an ironical situation.
Spectators find themselves in front of television screens at the racetrack
itself, as this is the only way to watch the slender, racing hejin run around
the very large track. The track is locally referred to as al doura
(circle) or al mirkadh (running place), and since it is 10 km in
distance, the only part of the race, which can be seen from the stadium, is the
start and finish, about 3 minutes in total. The remaining 15 minutes of the race
can only be viewed on one of the long line of TV screens placed especially in
front of the 100m stadium, accompanied by the commentator's voice thundering on
the air.
Marshall Macluhan' s famous statement, "the medium is the message"
(1964: 23), is very applicable to the growing phenomenon of camel racing in the
Gulf. Television as the ultimate modern communication technology has indeed
played a significant role in the evolution and popularization of this cultural
sport. It has not only fashioned the nature and style of producing cultural
messages related to camel racing, but has also shaped other supporting
activities surrounding this sport.
Wide access to television has empowered people to "compress space and
time" (Harvey 1989: 271) watching world events in ease and comfort. Unlike
writing, televised messages are direct; they carry a sense of immediacy and
"restore presence" of the events transmitted, and in this lies their
great appeal. Cultural messages transmitted by television do not require
elements of mediation specialized training leading to literacy between the
producers and receivers (Williams 1983: 111). Because of this, television has
enabled state agencies and other organizations involved in the production of
camel heritage to overcome certain constraints usually associated with
illiteracy. As most of those involved in the breeding and/or training of racing
camels in the Arabian Gulf are still illiterate or barely literate, television
production has an important effect.
On one of my visits to the encampment at the Al Wathba racetrack in the Abu
Dhabi Emirate, I asked a Saudi to come and watch the races with me. He replied,
"Why bother? It is all here in front of me. It is direct on the air. You
can even get a better commentary here on television." He was one of the
fortunate few to have pitched his tent close to the electricity mains supply,
and as a result he had furnished his tent with modern conveniences: TV,
refrigerator, and a fan. His statement reflects a common attitude among those
involved in camel racing; indeed, it explains the absence of large crowds at the
camel racing stadiums although the sport is tremendously popular, especially
among the Bedu.
To facilitate this televised sport, a special road has been built alongside
the racing track for the mobile television cameras, so that the entire race can
be viewed. Various modern television techniques are also utilized to make such
heritage races more attractive to make such heritage races more attractive to
watch. For example, often the TV screen is split: one half displays the
panoramic view of the race, the other shows the leading camels in close-up. In
addition, the finale of the race is viewed from a height as well as the side.
Television documentaries and other event-related programs on cultural
heritage, including camel racing, produce complex messages of multiple meanings
and functions. They can be viewed as both instruments of state political
legitimization and domination, and equally important, as means through which
local cultural identity is revived. The cultural discourse used in these
television heritage productions employs multiple forms, strategies, and styles
in order to drive home to viewers numerous simultaneous messages. During the
final camel races in April 1996 in Al Wathba in the Abu Dhabi Emirate, the
commentator of a special program on the races expounded at length on the place
and importance of camels and camel racing in present-day UAE society:
Shade, water, palm trees, and the camel are vocabularies which when joined
together mean the life of the true Arab Bedu. They also mean heritage filled
with glories. They mean noble deeds, high morals and fine qualities all of which
have become features of the Arab man. They make up his identity, where our
ancestors lived a life of desert hardship and scarcities. It was then inevitable
that they migrated in search of these essentials for their own life and that of
their animals. "Look for your friend before you look for your road" is
a saying whose meaning is clearly expressed when we come to the camel, the best
of friends.
The huge expanse of desert in the Arabian peninsula and other Arab lands
imposed upon the Bedu specific harsh modes of life that required endurance,
patience, and determination. In spite of life hardships, being faithful to one's
homeland was the ultimate noble motive that led the Arabs to build their lives
in the desert. In such life context the value of camels grew in the Arab's life
to become equal to his honor, glory, and dignity. These are attributes of honor
that the Arab is ready to pay for with his own life for their preservation.
Camels were not only used for migrating across desert land; they provided a
source of livelihood with their milk, wool, and meat. Most importantly, camels
occupied a large domain in the history of Arab glories. Day after day the bond
between the Arab man and his camel becomes stronger, and the camel's place and
significance increases. Isn't the significance of the camel stated clearly in
Allah's Great' Book, and in the Sunna of His Prophet as a testimony of the
Creator's great miracles in His own creation? Also the camel is to be seen as
concrete evidence of Allah's powers and his wonders in creation; and a
motivation for men to reflect about Allah and His ultimate knowledge.
With the passage of time the camel was transformed from being only an
instrument of transport and migration to an important pillar, a significant
feature in our heritage and traditional Arab character. In historical,
religious, and civilizational terms, camels can be associated in a long chain of
pride and glories. Built on this belief and in appreciation for the precious
heritage of the past His Highness Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, President
of the State, has formulated his goals and directives emphasizing the necessity
for showing appreciation and respect for this heritage, and to encourage our
nationals to practice the sport sibaqat al hejin (camel racing). Under
the rulership of His Highness, President of the State, may Allah protect him,
and due to his support of heritage, the value of al hejin is increasing
steadily.
This type of media information is significant as it simultaneously
encapsulates multiple knowledge discourses. It explains the adaptational bond
between the Bedu and their camels. More significantly, it invokes heritage
sentiments, cultural historical nostalgia, and other political and national
ideological messages.
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Changes in the organizational aspects of the production of the races are the
most evident and notable. They are heavily affected by the adoption of
technological innovations and methods of television media information.
The systematic modem development of camel racing in the UAE started in the
early 1980s. Those who were involved in the development of this sport throughout
the Gulf found themselves in a difficult situation, as this was a new sport and
there were few prior experiences on which they could draw. However, some
organizational methods and rules in horse racing have been adopted or modified
to suit camel races. For example, races are classified according to categories
of breed, age, and distance. In their quest to develop camel racing and promote
its popularity at home and beyond, people involved in this young-old sport had,
as informants pointed out, to learn the hard way; learn by trial and error. They
had to invent, adopt, and reassess their progress year after year. The
accumulation of the last fifteen years of experience has led to the development
of the sport according to an elaborate set of policies and rules that have now
brought greater order, fairness, and standardization to this cultural heritage
enterprise.
The realization of such a quest has been made possible, as the media
frequently reminds one, "by the inspiration, guidance, and instructions of
Shaikh Zayed, the President of the UAE, and his brothers, their excellencies,
the members of the Supreme Federal Council, Rulers of the Emirates." In
this context emerged the need to establish the Camel Racing Association (CRA) in
the UAE on 25th October 1992. The goals of this association are to continue the
development of this heritage sport by giving it institutionalized forms
throughout the country, made up of seven emirates. Basically this has meant
bringing standardization and uniformity in the organization and other aspects of
racing.
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The building of modem racetracks (referred to by the locals as al markadh',
lit. "running place"), is one of the most obvious developments of
camel racing in the UAE. As noted earlier, these racetracks have stadiums
ranging in their size and beauty , depending on the cities they neighbor. Most
of them were built in the early 1980s. The most famous ones are Al Wathba, about
30 km southeast of Abu Dhabi City, Nad Al Shiba, 10 km south of Dubai, and Al
Ain track in Al Maqam, 20 km west of the oasis city of Al Ain in the interior of
the country. The lesser tracks include Al Samba and Al Madam in Sharjah Emirate,
Al Siwan in Ras Al Khaimah, and Al Labsah in Umm Al Quwain. In addition, small
racetracks are built in desert areas where large concentrations of Bedu involved
in camel breeding live. These tracks, found particularly in Abu Dhabi and Dubai
Emirates, are used for training and local races, where buying and selling of the
hejin take place.
The major tracks, like Al Wathba and Nad Al Shiba, are well constructed with
attention to heritage-oriented aesthetical features. For example, Nad Al Shiba,
built by the Dubai local government, is an integrated camel racing facility of
the first order, stretching over 25 km2. It contains two tracks; the larger one,
known locally as al doura al kabiera (the large circle), is of 10 km but
can be shortened with specific openings and enclosures to 8 km. The smaller
track is located inside the larger track, and again through the use of openings
and enclosures it can accommodate races of 4, 5, or 6 km for younger camels.
The stadium, which faces the finishing line, is built in the shape of a large
white tent perched on a green bill of immaculately tidy lush green lawns,
swaying palm trees and flowering shrubs.
Eight flapping UAE flags on the spine on the tent give the whole structure a
feel of poised beauty in flight. In functional terms the tracks are provided
with all necessary services, personnel and equipment required for the six-month
racing season. The stadium has a seating capacity of 1,000 with a VIP section in
the centre. For the management of the races, the track is provided with a tower
for TV cameras at the finishing line, a special tarmac track for two TV cars, an
ambulance, and several microbuses which carry specialized personnel involved in
the management of racing in each round (shoudh). The stadium is provided
with TV sets in front of the seats, and sound amplifiers. Close to the starting
line there is a large enclosure to keep camels waiting for the races. Adjacent
to the tracks there is a police station, kitchen, toilets, a camel market of 56
shops specializing in food and accessories for camels, a mosque, a veterinary
centre, medical and drug testing clinic, and a large area of one square mile
primarily for the encampment of guest participants from neighboring Gulf
countries during the final months of the races. There is also a special area for
the display of about 150 luxury cars to be given as prizes at the end of the
season, late March or early April. More than 50 men are employed to maintain the
tracks and enclosures throughout the year. The CRA, Dubai Branch, hires them
from a company called EO (Engineering Office), and in their gray uniforms the
men, mainly from India and Pakistan, drive water trucks to sprinkle the tracks,
drive tractors to harrow and level the sand, and act as gardeners, cleaners, and
maintenance workers.
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It is relevant to note that the lean, slim, and agile racing camels (al hejin) now seen on the racetracks are not a recent product, as the Bedu of
Arabia have always bred fast camels. Given their desert pastoralist mode of life
they did not need to possess many camels for transport as beasts of burden.
Their main concern was breeding large numbers of fast riding camels that they
used as mataya (mounts) in raiding and defense. This is in contrast to camel
breeders in the Sudan, Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan who needed heavily built
camels primarily for transport and agricultural work.
The organizational innovation of introducing separate races for different
breeds of camel has contributed greatly to the development of the races, as the
specific categories of camel breed possess different physical qualities that
affect their performance on the track. Racing camels have been divided into
three categories, according to their physical type: a) the local breed, known as
al mahaliyat (local ones) or ra'iyat al dar (mistresses of
homeland), usually brown in colour, b) the Sudanese camels (al Sudaniyat),
which are usually a little bigger, faster, and white in colour, and c) the
interbreed (al muhajanat) of the first two.
Interbreeding has resulted, though, in the emerging problem of camel
identification, and to ensure fairness in the races paternity testing is now
carried out at the camel laboratory centre in Dubai. A laboratory analysis is
made of the father's and the child's blood, and if the father is a Sudanese
camel, then the child is also categorized as al Sudaniyat. Interbreed
camels are identified by a metal tag inserted under the skin on the neck, and
immediately before the races the camels are checked to confirm their muhajana
(interbreed) identity. Since 1997 the Sudaniyat camels have not been
allowed to participate in the races, and the intention is to ban this category
of camels altogether, and confine racing to the local, interbreed, and
occasionally Omaniyat (Omani camels).
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Camel races are now organized according to sex and age categories, as well as
the different breeds. One of the responsibilities of the Camel Racing
Association, through a special lijna (committee), is to ensure that only the
appropriate camels run in each race category. Members of this committee are
experienced camel breeders who usually rely on teeth extraction to determine the
age of the camel. This move has introduced greater fairness to the races.
Table: Camel Categories
| Arabic Local Names |
Age in Years |
Distance in km |
Average Running Time (min/sec ) |
| Haq |
2-3 |
4 |
6.50 |
| Leqai/Madrab |
3-4 |
5 |
8.50 |
| Yetha' (male and female) |
4-5 |
7
8 |
13.00
14.30 |
Thanaya
Thanaya abkar (females)
Thanaya je'dan (males) |
5-6 |
8
8 |
14.00
14.20 |
Hool
Thulel (females)
Zumool (males) |
over 6 |
10
10 |
17.00
17.30 |
The table of camel categories shows the Arabic local names of the various
categories of camels divided by sex and age, the distance specified for the
races, and average running time.
Camels can continue racing until they are 12 to 14 years of age; then they
retire to the breeding farms. It is of relevance to note that just over 90% of
the racing camels are female. Usually only one in every 10 races is for male
camels; often the second round of the races is given to males. The male races
are further subdivided into two categories: khasaya (castrated) and ghair
khasaya (uncastrated); the latter represents the majority of races. There
are several reasons why al thulel (female camels) are dominant in the
races; first, most young male camels are slaughtered by the Bedu for social
celebrations, such as weddings. Only a few of the male camels are spared,
primarily for reproductive purposes. Secondly, female camels are usually faster;
by an average of 30 seconds in the race, and thirdly, the females are more
gentle and easier to handle. The races usually take place during the winter,
which coincides with the rutting season for camels. This makes the uncastrated
males quite temperamental and more difficult to control during training and at
the races.
Return to Index
Races are also organized according to the social categories of owners, a
strategy aimed at providing greater diversity and opportunities for competing
camels. Since racing camels owned by the ruling shaikhs in the various emirates
are of the best stock, they have high chances of winning every event that would
be devastating to the ordinary Bedu breeders. Thus there are three types of ash
wadh (rounds): a) races specified for al shuyoukh (shaikhs); b) races
for al shuyoukh and al qaba'il (tribes), also known as a'am
(general races); and c) races specified for 'abna' al qaba'il (sons of
the tribes), also referred to as lil jama'a (the tribal groups).
Usually hejin al shuyoukh are run in the morning (7:30-10:00 a.m.),
and races start early so as to make maximum use of the fresh hours of the day.
Most of the races specified for the Bedu take place in the afternoon (2:30-5:00
p.m.). These races are often watched by the camel breeders for the shaikhs, who
come to identify particularly good racing camels, and may purchase them for the
shaikhs' camel farms.
Return to Index
For the last twelve years strict feeding programs have been introduced for
the overall welfare and "running fair" of the racing camels.
Nutritionists have been employed from the Netherlands, and a feedmill has been
in operation for many years with a British manager. All feed except alflafa
(locally called al jat or barseem) is imported, and mixed in the
feedmill. According to specialists at the Dubai Veterinary Laboratory, racing
camels nowadays have a well-balanced diet, a high-energy feed consisting of oats
and barley, with vitamin supplements and trace elements added to the feed. While
camels are not true ruminants, they do nonetheless ruminate and need a lot of
fiber. During the racing season, camels are put on a special feed and are not
allowed to roam and forage in the desert.
On the other hand, breeding camels are allowed to feed in the desert, with
additional special feed. Usually a baby camel is taken away from its mother when
it is between 13 to 16 months old, and is then put on a race-training program.
This will produce a fast camel at the age of 3 years, when it is allowed to
enter the races. The mother can give birth to another calf after about 13
months.
The steady advances in camel health care are reflected by the growth of the
Central Veterinary Research Laboratory in Dubai, which was established in 1986
primarily for the purpose of experimental research into reproduction of better
breeds of racing camels, control of camel diseases, and to ensure the general
welfare of the animals. The centre started with 3 employees, but by 1997 it had
grown to 25 specialists, including 5 biochemists and 20 scientific assistants.
Various other institutions are associated with the laboratory, including clinics
for camels, horses, and falcons, and reproduction and fertility laboratories.
The ruling family of Dubai alone employ 10 veterinarians recruited from Pakistan
in their special camel clinics, and these bring camel disease cases and
specimens to the laboratory.
According to Dr. Ulrich Wernery, a German microbiologist who joined the
center as its director in 1987, the work of the center has helped in eradicating
and controlling many camel diseases. Consequently the health of camels has
improved steadily, not only in the UAE but in Somalia, Sudan, and Pakistan, and
currently the center is proposing the establishment of a veterinary school in
the UAE. The center examines every year 15,000 camels owned by the Dubai shaikhs
and, to a lesser extent, the Bedu camel breeders. Every camel has a health check
once a year, some more frequently. The purpose of this is to chart the running
performance, and especially the relative ratio of red blood corpuscles in the
blood. One of the main objectives of the center is to help in the production of
faster racing camels, and over the last three years the average winning time of
a 10 km race has been reduced by two minutes.
The production of faster racing camels is not confined to producing good
genes and maintaining high quality health care for these lean beasts of the
desert. Equally important is their training for the track, their feeding, and
other aspects of their management. An elaborate organizational hierarchy has
emerged over the last two decades, reflecting the new dynamics generated by oil
wealth and the interplay of local and global forces and methods in camel care
and training. At the top of the hierarchy reside the owners of the camels,
notably the ruling shaikhs of the various emirates. They own the finest and
largest number of racing camels, and as the media states, it is their vision,
financial support, love, and attachment to camels, policies, guidance, and
inspiration to develop the races that have given rise to the establishment of
the CRA in the UAE and the phenomenon of heritage revival at large.
In hierarchical terms, next to the shaikhly owners there are a small number
of wealthy merchant families who own camels, particularly in the Emirates of Abu
Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah. Their interest in racing camels is motivated by three
main reasons: for commercial purposes, in terms of buying and selling camels;
the attainment of prestige; and emulating the ruling families in heritage
revival. Thus they come to share in social honor and the symbolic capital that
is manufactured through the modem media. The Bedu tribesmen's position as owners
of racing camels came about because of the collapse of traditional camel herding
and camel transport economy, and their capacity to shift their traditional
knowledge and skills to the breeding of racing camels in the context of the new
oil economy. Many of these owners possess only a few camels, and equally
important, they rely on the generosity of the shaikhs to employ them as trainers
of the shaikhs' camels. Further notes on ownership will be raised in more detail
under the economico-political aspects of racing.
The CRA as a managerial body is involved in all aspects of camel racing
throughout the season; the larger umbrella organization embodies smaller
branches in each of the emirates. It also mobilizes various committees whose
supervision is essential for well-controlled, orderly, and fair races that are
also colorful, exciting, and enjoyable to watch.
The Association's duties go beyond formulating rules necessary for greater
development of the races, and include a) preparing the racetracks and ensuring
they are well-equipped; b) ensuring equal training and participation
opportunities for all camel owners (all interested citizens have a right to
participate); c) making a detailed schedule for the hundreds of races each
season, culminating in the finals in Dubai and Abu Dhabi with the winners
presented with prestigious trophies donated by the leading shaikhs; d) selection
of referees and judges for the races; e) contacting commercial and other
establishments for donations of attractive prizes (4-wheel drive luxury
vehicles, BMWs, etc.); and f) ensuring wide press coverage of racing events.
At the races themselves numerous lijan (committees) can be seen at
work. There is, for example, a committee to identify and control specific camel
age and breed categories, which issue identification markers for the races.
There is also lijnat al ta'rief, the committee to identify the owners of
running camels, who accompany the TV commentator round the racetrack to give
information on the leading camels. Their work is made easier nowadays as the
larger camel stables have adopted specific colors for the vest of the rakbi
(jockey). This strategy has been generalized across the Gulf Arab countries, as
racing camels from different countries participate in many of the large races,
which are timed to allow racing enthusiasts to truck camels and trainers from
one country to the next (mainly UAE, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Oman).
There are also lijan to watch the start and finish lines. The finishing line
committee is responsible for identifying the first ten racing camels for each
race, and can resort to televised images in cases of dispute. The winners
receive a card that is immediately taken to a mobile office, set up in a car,
where a paper is signed and stamped. This is then taken to the "Prize
Awarding Committee," basically a treasurer and an accountant, who sit at
two small desks and distribute cash prizes varying in value according to the
race positions achieved. The owners of the first three camels, however, do not
receive prizes immediately. These camels are taken to a clinic to be tested for
the use of drugs, and the owners have to wait a day or two for the results. Any
use of energizing drugs will not only disqualify a camel, but entail loss of
face and personal integrity for the owner. At the larger races, however, the
first three camels do receive immediate honorary treatment; their heads are
decorated with saffron imported from Syria, and they are paraded in front of the
stadium for a few minutes, so that VIPs and others have a full view of their
stature against the background of manicured lush green lawns.
There is also a medical committee, consisting of paramedics who accompany the
racing camels in their ambulance. If any rakbi looks sick, as sometimes the boys
suffer from race nausea, then the ambulance staff will stop him and relieve him
and the camel from the exhaustion of the long race.
The ruling shaikh's gesture of hospitality to all those participating in the
races expresses itself through the work of the lijnat al dheyafa, the
hospitality committee. The staff are involved in distributing foodstuffs, as
gifts from the shaikh, to all the breeders, trainers, and caretakers of racing
camels, who usually camp with the camels in special designated areas near the
racetracks, or al race, as it has been arabized and frequently referred
to by the Bedu. These food gifts include lambs, sacks of rice, tea, sugar,
coffee, cardamom, cheese, condensed milk, etc. Participants coming from outside
the emirates are welcomed with added attention and generosity.
Return to Index
Racing camel trainers occupy an important position in the management
structure of camel racing outside the activities supervised and/or performed by
committees of the Camel Racing Association. As with breeding, training is still
the domain of the Bedu. The trainers are known locally as al mudhamer
(literally the person who makes the camel lean and fit), and come from desert
camel-based families where traditional knowledge and love for racing camels is
in the air around them. The mudhamer's personal success in training winning
camels is usually the road to his fame, as he then becomes well known and may be
approached by the shaikhs to train their camels. Since training plays an
important role in giving the camel greater opportunities for winning, good
trainers can achieve both fame and fortune in the racing camel world of oil rich
Arabia. Top trainers are a scarce commodity and can actually fetch high prices
for their expertise and skills.
There are two types of camel training. The first type is referred to locally
as al adab, which means proper behavior, or al ta'ah (obedience)
as the Sudanese trainers call it. This involves breaking in the young camel when
it is about 13-14 months old; the process takes about 1 to 3 months.
It involves attaching the young camel by rope to an old quiet well-seasoned
camel known as al qeliesa, to act as a guide and companion in the
training process. The young camel is trained to wear the al khidham, the
rope fixed around the head to control the camel's movements, and the al
shidad, the soft blanket saddle. It becomes accustomed to being mounted by a
young rider, and most importantly, it gets trained to run on the track. One of
the common sights on al mirkadh (the racing track) at non-racing times
are young, often teenage, Balochi, Sudanese, and Somali trainers riding their
qeliesa camels with their sticks in hand, each leading two to four young camels
that in turn have small rakbiya (plural of rakbi) perched on their backs. This
training is done frequently until the camel acquires the running aptitude so
that she can negotiate the al mirkadh with ease and confidence. When the
camel is three years old, she graduates to enter the al mirkadh as a
member of al liqaya (the three year old crop of racing camels).
It should be noted here that the qeliesa riders-cum-trainers were
often a few years back small rakbiya riding in the heat of serious races.
However, their fast body growth and increased weight have forced them to
graduate from the backs of the lean athletic camels to the relatively heavy and
quiet qeliesa, which themselves have been forced to retire from the
track-and-field athletic business. While sitting in Nad al Shiba camel stadium
in Dubai I turned to Sudanese boy who sat next to me. Guessing that he is
involved in the camel business, I asked him, "What do you do?" "I
am a trainer," he answered half shyly. Then he explained that only three
years ago he was a rakbi, but now he breaks in camels and helps in training them
on al mirkadh. His father and two uncles also work in the camel business.
Apparently over the last fifteen years the northern central region of Sudan (Um
Delaiq) has been exporting many camel experts, mostly from the camel tribes of al
Badaheen, al Kowahla, and al Hawara. Similarly the Rashayda
tribe in the Kasala region of Sudan has been sending camel boys of all ages to
the UAE as well as other oil rich Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia.
The second and more important type of training is called al tadhmeer,
which is aimed at achieving high athletic fitness for racing camels. The term al
tadhmeer literally means "making the camels slender and fit." The
trainers in charge of the process are locally known as al mudhamer, and
are mostly Bedu. There are those who got into the profession in a de facto
manner as they began breeding their own pure pedigrees of racing hejin, and
subsequently got involved in training them to enter races when the racing hejin
phenomenon started with force in the early 1980s. However, some Bedu trainers
were hired as mudhamers for the training of racing camels bought by the shaikhs.
There is, however, a strong link between the two, as often a shaikh upon buying
few camels from a Bedu breeder decides that the camels should stay with him as
their caretaker and trainer, as he is the best person to know and care for the
camels. Then through the shaikh's private office the mudhamer gets allocated the
required finances to establish an 'azba (camel farm). This means that he
gets a set monthly salary, wages for laborers, a four-wheel drive car, a mobile
phone, radio, water tank truck, petrol expenses, necessary fodder, and so on.
Most mudhamers I talked to repeated that they do it not only to gain an income
but also because they love to do it. They relate to it both as a job and a
hobby, and in this lies their dedication and total engagement to the hejin. In
fact, many of them have succeeded in attracting their adult sons who were doing
their university studies into this competitive brave new world of camels.
There is more or less a uniform camel training pattern followed by al
mudhamers. However, when talking to them they present themselves as training
experts who are different from others in some variation, strategy, or method.
The training program usually begins early in July for the weaker camels, while
stronger ones are put on the training regime around late August. The program
begins with al tasrieh, taking the camels out for walking in the desert
early in the morning. Initially the al tasrieh distance is around 20 km;
in the training context al tasrieh means to let camels roam and forage
while at the same time they are guided to do some serious walking. The camels
are brought back to the 'azba before the scorching midday heat. Upon their
return they get fed al jat (alfalfa) and barley and are given water. Then
they rest in al mersagh (the shaded shelter) until around 3 o'clock when
they are given water and a large handful of dates.
At the beginning of October the training and feeding change in several ways. Al
tasrieh (sometimes called al minshar) walking distance is increased
to 40 km a day. Food and water are carried out to the camels in al minshar
(the roaming pasture land). They return to al mersagh between 4 and 6 0'
clock in the afternoon for their dinner. The camel eats two qlala (large
bunches) of al jat daily. About two months before the races some of the
camels are selected by their trainer as having a good opportunity to perform
well, and these are given special feed that includes minerals, milk, and honey
in measured quantities. They also receive greater attention, not only in terms
of more frequent medical checkups but also in terms of their general welfare and
health care against insects, dirt, and changing weather elements. The al
tasrieh process usually consists of 3 to 5 hours purpose-oriented walking
daily, with the aim of making the camel lose fat, and become well trimmed and
fit.
Various workers are employed in the camel 'az ba under the supervision
of the Bedu mudhamer, and each is assigned specific tasks to perform daily. For
example, an 'azba with ten racing camels requires three to four workers.
One will be involved in taking the camels out for al tasrieh (walking and
foraging), while the second will be responsible for preparing fodder and water.
A third may be assigned the task of keeping the camels clean and groomed. In
addition, the rakbi boys usually will be seen around as helpers in miscellaneous
tasks. While they are actually hired as camel jockeys they also get general
training as caretakers of camels under the supervision of their father or male
relative. Sometimes a rakbi will work and live under the wing of a compassionate
mudhamer who more or less adopts the young boy and sees him grow up to become a
young camel trainer by the time he is 15 years old. Most of the hired laborers,
including tile young trainers, come from neighboring poor countries like Sudan,
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Somalia, Mauritania, and also Oman. This
category of laborers represents the least paid and lowest stratum within the
hierarchical pecking order of this camel cultural industry. Their monthly wage
averages around DR. 600-800 (U.S.$180-220).
In addition to the regular and systematic al tasrieh, which is aimed
at giving the camel general leanness and fitness, comes running training called al
tajheem, which usually begins in early November. While some al tajheem
exercises are done on small local rings, the serious training is conducted on
the major racetracks. The long period of preliminary races, extending from
October to the end of January, is arranged in such a way that they take place
alternatively every second week. This allows camel owners and trainers to bring
their camel athletes to exercise on the track. At the end of morning and
afternoon racing sessions hundreds of camels can be seen entering al doura,
the ring, for al tajheem practice. The process is controlled in that only
five to ten camels are allowed to start at a given time to avoid overcrowding
and injuries.
The distance is not fixed but decided upon by the trainer, according to the
distance the camel is expected to run in actual races and the trainer's own
plans and training program.
The goal of al tajheem is to get the camel used to running over
specified distances. During the al tajheem period the quality of the camel's
diet improves radically. Most trainers offer their fine athletes additional rich
nourishing foods like dates, barley, cow's and goat's milk which is mixed with
very expensive natural local honey ($150-200 per kilo), purified butter and
local thick pancakes (al qures). Intake of such rich food compensates for the
tremendous energy lost during al tajheem training.
Racing camels also undergo a further training process called al tahfeez,
literally meaning "to prod the camel to empty her bowels." This
usually takes place two days before the race. The camels are then covered with
specially tailored blankets, and led away to the camp where they are washed.
They get a little water and alight meal, are covered again, and then their
mouths are covered with a special hood to prevent them from eating further. The
following day they spend in total rest and fasting in preparation for their
participation in the races.
It is worth noting here that good mudhamers become famous throughout
the land primarily because of televised media, as their names are always being
mentioned by TV commentators during the big races. In fact, the camel rakbi'
s uniform, in addition to the colors of the owner, now carries a special stripe
of a particular colour to identify a specific mudhamer, since each of the
shaikhs employs dozens of mudhamers
One Sudanese man in his early twenties from the al Rashayda tribe told
me the story of how' he and his older brother were recruited along with many
others as camel rakbiya in 1982:
My brother and I were in primary school, he was in the fifth year while I
was in the second year. We were taken from our village and spent about 15 days
in Khartoum. We were about 15 boys, and when we arrived at Abu Dhabi airport we
were taken away in small vans to Zayed City in the desert, west of Abu Dhabi
City. The men in charge of me sent me to school for one year. The beginning of
my experience as a camel rider was difficult and very tiring. Sometimes I felt
sick and I used to stop the camel. However, I soon learnt the skills of camel
riding and became quite good at it. My brother was then taken somewhere else, to
another camel 'alba. For a while I didn't know exactly where he was. After four
years I quit my 'alba and ran back to the 'azba where I was initially and
officially assigned. I moved to work in different camel farms and finally came
to see some of our relatives in the Al Ain region. Then we were both fortunate
to get hired by camel people in Al Ain. Now I have gained experience and
intuition about camels over the last 16 years, and most camels I nominate as
winners usually win.
The two brothers and some of their Rashayda relatives are now involved with
other Sudanese camel people in free-lance trading in camels. I was informed by
many Sudanese informants that the monthly salaries of the rakbiya used to be far
better than the current low salaries. Rakbi used to earn between 1200-1300 DH,
but now for Arab boys the monthly wages are 800 DH. The recruitment of many
rakbiya from Bangladesh, Somalia, and Pakistan have led to the lowering of wages
earned by such young gallant riders to 500-800 DH per month (around $150-200).
In addition to the material and moral support of the ruling shaikhs, the
rapid evolution of camel racing in the UAE is in part due to the continuing work
and dedication of the CRA. I will note here only a few of the rules and
regulations set up recently by the CRA to indicate both the wide scope and
coverage of small details which have in their totality advanced an evolving
cultural sport. As noted earlier, the CRA' s rules cover a wide range of
organizational aspects of the races. There are rules specifying racing dates,
camel categories, and distances. For example, rules written in 1993 state that
camel races shall start in all racing tracks in the UAE from the first of
September every year. The rules then specify the names of camel categories and
distances throughout the season, which usually ends in late March or early
April. "Races shall be run once or twice every month on Thursdays and
Fridays in accordance with the program set for this purpose. Other races may be
run on national or special occasions or during official festivals. Two or more
special races with large cash prizes shall be run annually; such races shall be
held during the racing season and under the supervision of the Camel Racing
Association. These races shall be called the Zayed Grand Cash Prize Races, and
dates, value of cash prizes, and programs of these races shall be determined in
due course."
The rules state that the number of camels participating in each round of the
race shall be between 25 and 30 camels. "Camels which their owners wish to
participate in the races shall be registered in order to distribute them
according to the number of rounds. Registration shall be made serially and on
'first come first served' basis four days in advance of the fixed date for the
race." On young camels it states, "Young camels under the age of al
yetha' shall be prohibited from participating in the races." On the
Sudaniyat category of camels it states that "Two rounds only in each race
shall be allocated to the Sudaniyat camels. One round for the shaikhs, combining
hoof and zumool, and one round to tribesmen." With regard to camels given
by the shaikhs to tribesmen it is noted "a) Camels given as a gift from
their excellencies the shaikhs to tribesmen shall be identified and b) such
camels shall be named, registered, photographed, and branded for identification
as the property of (x) person."
The CRA also made regulations in 1993 on the camel jockeys: "a) small
children are not allowed as camel jockeys; b) the jockey's weight should be
similar to the international standards of the horse jockeys and their weight
shall not be less than 45 kg; c) the jockey shall be medically examined to
ensure his fitness; d) the jockey has to wear the protection helmet; e) each
jockey shall be given an identity card which is issued in accordance with the
conditions acceptable and approved in all emirates and racetracks; f) persons
who breach these specific regulations set in respect of the jockey as indicated
above will not be allowed to participate in the races of the season."5
On dharb al hejin (camel beating) the rules clarify "a) beating
camels is not allowed at the start of the race until the distance of 1.5 km is
reached; b) in accordance with principles of animal welfare, beating racing
camels should be light and directed to alert and to prod the camel for greater
speed; c) branding the jockey's stick around is not allowed as this may cause
injury to others on the track."
In a similar fashion one finds numerous detailed rules on the number and
identities of cars running inside the ring parallel to the racing camels, rules
on control or prevention of certain camel types which disturb the smooth running
of the races and even rules on the order and proper quiet behavior of spectators
in the stadium.
It should be noted, however, that some of these rules are subject to
modification. For example, the Sudaniyat camels and their like, called al
harayer, have been banned since the 1997 season from participating in the
races. In accordance with the directives of His Highness the President of the
UAE, Shaikh Zayed, a new rule was formulated in May 1996 separating racing
camels into two categories: al muhajanat (interbreed) and al mahaliyat
(the local thoroughbreds). This is aimed at giving the local purebred camels a
greater chance of winning as the types and thus the number of competitive camels
are narrowed down. The rules have also been changed with regard to the jockey's
weight. Although the CRA formulated a rule in January 1993 that his weight
should not be less than 45 kg, only six months later it was voiced by the Bedu
involved in the races that this rule was not realistically suitable. As a
result, the CRA' s regulation on the issue of jockey's weight was changed to
"not less than 35 kg." One can see small boys perched like birds on
the top of these slender camels.
It was argued by the camel experts that the lightweight jockey is very
important in camel racing. This is not only to achieve greater speed, but it
also relates to the fact that camels do not mature before six years. This is why
the 10 km races are confined to camels that are six years old and more.
Repeatedly putting a heavier adult jockey on young racing camels may damage the
camel's spine. Unlike the horse, it is not possible to put stirrups on the
camel's back so that the jockey can stand and thus distribute his weight on the
whole body frame of the camel.
Additional organizational details and rules are added every year during the
final races. In the program booklet distributed at the Dubai camel racing finals
in February 1998, there are. the following notes on the first page from the
organization committee: "The organization committee will give medical tests
(check on the use of drugs) to the camels winning the first three positions. We
request the co-operation from every one. The Sudaniyat camels are strictly not
allowed to participate with the local breed camels. Warning: it has been noted
lately that some camel owners and mudhamers are providing their jockeys with an
apparatus discharging electric shocks to be applied on camels to induce greater
speed. The committee forbids the use of such devices. Those found possessing it
in the races will be disqualified and the apparatus will be confiscated."6
Return to Index
The detailed description of the organizational aspects of camel racing in the
UAE has shed light on the scope and significance of the economic dimension of
this whole national cultural industry, and therefore my notes on economic
aspects will be brief. As stated earlier, the emergence of this camel phenomenon
needs to be understood within the broad context of the oil economy and the
building of the modern nation-state that has generated multiple transformations
in the society at large.
During the initial phase of the oil boom traditional economic activities
collapsed relatively quickly. Traditional pastoralism, on which the camels
totally depended, was not an exception. Camels were margina1ized, as old Bedu
pastoralists were attracted to easier jobs, better salaries, and a more
comfortable existence in towns or newly built village communities. However, they
remained feeling ill at ease in the rapidly changing oil world. In the
mid-seventies their views and sentiments about the increasing loss of their
camels, which represented their traditional wealth and repertoire of traditional
skills, symbols, and meanings, were voiced to their ruling shaikhs. In one
television interview with Shaikh Zayed he stated his reply to his complaining
camel tribesmen, "Give us some time to think of ways and approaches to do
something about this deteriorating camel situation." Informants love to
quote Shaikh Zayed saying to his Bedu tribesmen, "Look after your camels
well. A day will come when they will be worth millions." While this
statement was put in a rather prophetic form, it is not now too far from
reality. Shaikh Zayed in a 1997 TV program gave many reasons for the increasing
attention to camels. One of them was the statement that " . . . we are in
debt to camels. Therefore we are obliged to protect them and those who grew up
with them. Protecting the camels (al hejin) means providing material benefits
and interests for their owners."
The Canadian anthropologist Louise Sweet in a 1970 article explained that
camel raiding among the North Arabian Bedouins was essentially "a mechanism
of ecological adaptation." Bedouin groups when hungry and in need raided
each other on the backs of their agile hejin to capture wealth; thus she viewed
raiding as a suitable strategy, a functionally adaptive mechanism within the
context of the constantly changing desert ecology. Raiding was, in economic
tenI1S, a strategy, a war sport in order to keep camel wealth circulating among
groups which often competed and warred with each other over scarce desert
resources. Transferring this theoretical notion to viewing camels racing with
and against each other within the new context of the oil economy is quite
attractive. It offers a plausible explanation to see these thousands of camels
racing against each other on the track as a way of capturing some of the new and
abundant oil wealth. As some Bedu say, "Once you get into that camel ring
you cannot get out of it."7
It is understandable why it becomes difficult to get away from such a
"ring," as the stakes are quite large. In economic terms, the racing
ring becomes the field through which, as far as camel breeders are concerned,
one can get to the lavish and abundant bounty of the oil state. During the long
racing season the ring and the multiple little and not-so-little economic fields
which grow around it offer rich pasture land, so to speak, where running camels
and their owners can forage in the new terrain of oil ecology which is now
governed by rules and methods of its own.
This kind of analytical explanation becomes more plausible when we recall the
specifics of the political economy of the oil state (dawlat al naft) in
the Gulf. As a type of polity and governance the oil state is characterized by
having a hereditary shaikhly ruling family in control of both power and
executive authority of a growing state structure. The right of rule of the
shaikhly dynastic families, who are linked to notable tribal origins, is still
partly legitimized by shared beliefs in old values and political traditions. The
state controls and manages both the production and marketing of oil. Therefore,
because of this privileged role and through the executive power in the hands of
its shaikhs or emirs, the state controls "the means of allocation" of
wealth in society (Ismail 1982). As a result the state is given a uniquely
powerful role in society; it is the largest and most powerful employer. In the
UAE over 95% of all employed nationals work in the state public sector (Al Faris
1996).
As an embodiment of political society, the oil state nowadays dominates
"civil society" in exaggerated form (Khalaf and Hammoud 1988: 351).
The fact that the state relies primarily on autonomous sources of income (oil
revenues) means that it has become, in economic terms, disarticulated from its
underlying population. This emergent structural economic disarticulation between
the state and its population is not mirrored in other areas of socioeconomic
life. The distribution of oil wealth has in a sense helped the state to come
closer to its small communities. This has been achieved through the ruler's
economic capacity and commitment to modernize state and society. Modernization
has meant that the state became primarily engaged in the distribution of oil
wealth among its very small population. This has been achieved through four main
channels: a) modernizing state political infrastruture, that is, building state
departments and agencies; b) building extensive public works and myriad social
welfare institutions which provide free welfare services and provisions; c) an
open-door policy for employing its citizens within the still burgeoning state
and welfare institutions; and d) offering extensive economic help to nationals
to start their own small businesses which they manage while still maintaining
their public jobs.
In view of the above, it is not surprising that this emerging type of welfare
state, personified by the ruling shaikhly dynasties, has produced in the eyes of
its underlying small population an image of a paternalistic, all-omnipotent,
all-providing, all-generous giving father. In economico-political terms we can
therefore understand why the Bedu camel breeders, when talking about their
present conditions, raise their hands and tongues in praise to Allah and their
shaikhs. The phenomenon of heritage revival, such as the building and continuous
modernization of camel racetracks, becomes in itself an avenue for distributing
wealth among the camel people and far beyond. This same economic process can be
seen in the revival of other traditional economic activities, like the building
of old traditional pearling boats, sailing boat races, pearl diving, the
construction of several heritage villages, and so forth.
The significant point that needs to be noted here is that the role of camels
within the new context of the oil state has been transformed, on the surface at
least, from the realm of economy to that of culture. Having said that, we should
immediately reaffirm that the production of camel racing as a cultural sport has
many economic underpinnings. The Bedu are fully aware of the importance of these
economic dynamics which support the reproduction of camel races as cultural
festive spectacles, and which manifest themselves ill numerous areas.
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The dynastic shaikhly ruling families in the emirates, like Al Nahyan of Abu
Dhabi and Al Maktoum of Dubai, are quite large, and most members are involved
now in owning fine racing camels that they entrust to Bedu camel breeders as
their trainers. According to informed sources, it is estimated that the three
senior brothers of Al Maktoum family own around 15,000 camels, and around one
third of this number is used for breeding racing camels. Shaikh Mohammed alone
has more than 30 trainers. We can estimate the large numbers of Bedu mudhamers
employed by them, particularly when it is known that camel farms range in size
from 6 to 100 camels, some being even larger. It should be remembered that the
shaikhly ruling families are quite large. Among them the ownership of fine
racing camels has indeed become a contagious and popular socio-cultural
activity.
Shaikh Zayed, President of the UAE, and his eldest son, Shaikh Khalifa have
both established scientific centers for breeding racing camels on the outskirts
of Al Ain City. Several camel specialists, immunologists, and laboratory
research assistants have been recruited from places as far away as Australia to
staff these centers, which are equipped with elaborate technologies for training
camels in gymnasium-like settings that include a camel swimming pool. The
financial management of Shaikh Zayed's and Shaikh Khalifa's camel farms is done
through a special department known as Al Da'era Al Khassa, The Private
Department of His Highness The President of the State and HRH, The Crown Prince.
It is a large 2-floored building located in Al Ain City, and has around 100
employees who manage the monthly expenditure of 25 million dirhams (U.S.$6.2
million). This money is spent not only on camel farms but also on agricultural
farms and palaces as well as their private guards, known locally as al
medharzeya. The mudhamers in the shaikhs' camel farms receive around DH
10,000 as a monthly salary, which is adequate to support the large families
usually still found among Bedu tribesmen. Many of them have supplementary income
derived from small commercial enterprises, and some breed racing camels of their
own for both Facing and/or selling in the market for the highest offer. The
mudhamer is given a four-wheel drive car, a water tank truck, a mobile phone,
and a walkie-talkie radio that he uses to give instructions to the jockey during
serious races. The jockey wears his strapped on his chest under his jockey
jacket. He only receives messages and cannot talk back to his mudhamer.
The economic role the shaikhs have played in the development of the camel
phenomenon is remarkable indeed, and fits in with the larger economic and
development policies of the state that are aimed at improving the material life
conditions of the Bedu and oasis farming communities in the country. Cordes and
Scholz (1982) have noted that the state has four major goals in supporting
farming and animal production including camels. These are: a) to encourage the
Bedu to gradually change to new settled economic activities, b) to help in
meeting the country's need for meat and dairy products, c) to maintain a secure
source of income for the Bedu, and d) to limit migration from rural areas to the
cities. In fact the state in this regard has been very generous in its material,
practical, and ideological support for the realization of such goals. In return,
as expected, the state, personified by the ruling shaikhs, is reaping wide
political support and continuous praise and glorification.
In addition to the shaikhs, there are also some wealthy merchant families who
are involved in breeding racing camels, and some tribesmen raise their own
racing camels and hire shepherds and laborers from foreign lands to do the
manual tasks on the farm.
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The main incentive for the Bedu to breed and train camels for the races
hinges on the prospect of selling winning camels for very high prices, sometimes
fetching several million dirhams each. Camels that have proven records of being
among the first ten positions always fetch high prices. It is the shaikhs and
some wealthy merchants with economic power who affect the scale of camel prizes.
Businessmen are described as the big speculators in the stocks and shares of
racing camels, driven by search for greater profits, compared with the Bedu who
are actually involved in it because it is their livelihood and simultaneous
source of cultural satisfaction and pleasure.
As the racing season intensifies during the cool months of February and
March, another type of camel market springs up along the margins of the
racetracks. Camel owners and traders bring large bulky camels known as al
mejaheen or al hezami, used for meat, milk, and transport. Usually
trade in this type of camel is confined to an assigned area provided by the
authorities of the racetrack. Some of these huge beasts of burden are trucked in
from faraway places like Oman and Saudi Arabia. The prices these camels fetch
are usually only a fraction of what the fine breeds of racing camels can get.
One also can see traders of lesser means who come from Sudan, Oman, or Somalia.
Some of them worked many years as camel shepherds and trainers with the local
Bedu and finally opted to work on their own in small groups as mobile
freelancing sellers and buyers of hejin.
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These are specialized camel shopping souks that come alive during the long
racing season. Three hundred meters away from the Dubai racetrack there is a
large camel shopping mall with 56 shops. It was built ten years ago by Shaikh
Hamdan of the Maktoum family, and thus it became known among locals as Souk Al
Shaikh Hamdan. The shop's rent is deliberately kept low at DH 2,000 per year
(around U.S.$500). It is now administered by the Dubai Municipality that has
kept the same rent. A walk in the souk is a delightful experience with
shopkeepers and shoppers from all comers of the globe. Most of the shopkeepers
are from Pakistan or Afghanistan (Balochis and Patans) who look quite impressive
with their fine beards and large turbans. Some also are from India and
Bangladesh, and you can meet date salesmen from Al Ahwaz in southwest of Iran
and hay trucks from Al Qaseim in northern Saudi Arabia. The shops in the souk
sell camel medicines, foods, and various types of camel accessories. Huge
amounts of al jat (alfalfa) are sold by Pakistani vendors operating under a big
shaded area in the middle of the rectangular shape souk. This in turn keeps
agricultural farms happy as there is always a high demand for their grass.
Mobile goat and lamb sellers in the pickup trucks also find ground for
themselves on the periphery of the souk. It even has a few shops for a tailor, a
laundry, a restaurant, and video shop selling reproductions of the big races for
100 DH each. Some of these shops operate inside like a traditional cottage
industry. You can see the Balochi shopkeepers weaving, sewing, or braiding the
special camel robes and decorative pieces while waiting for customers to pop in.
Some of them coming from the depths of Afghanistan live like squatters under
carton boxes and plastic sheets adjacent to the racetrack of Al Ain in the depth
of the desert interior.
The Dubai camel souk is one of the very few places where an expatriate worker
can rent a shop without a national kafeel (sponsor). The vibrant commercial
traffic of the souk subsides dramatically with the ending of the final races at
the beginning of April. Therefore, many of the Asian shopkeepers prefer to
return home for a long spring-summer holiday. Similarly, the business of
trucking camels from one emirate to another, or from one Gulf country to
another, is very profitable throughout the winter season and early spring.
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During the final races in Dubai and Abu Dhabi it is evident how the
commercial companies owned by leading merchant families make their presence
glitter in the thick of racetrack events while utilizing modem advertising and
promotion strategies. The modem market represented by the local global companies
contribute to the success and development of the races by giving away luxury
cars as prizes, to be awarded to winning camels in the many rounds of the final
races.
The sight of 100 or more fine European and Japanese cars -- BMW, Mercedes,
Lexus, Toyota Land Cruiser, Nissan Patrol Super Safaris, etc -- shining under
the sun is a tantalizing view, enticing the desires of Bedu camel breeders and
trainers. For them winning a car is not capturing an expensive prize but the
prospective value of their camel multiplies several times. "She won a
car" has become one of the yardsticks through which the superior quality of
a racing camel can be confirmed. The al namous (social honor and
prestige) obtained in the process is obviously the symbolic crowning that goes
with the car, which both shaikh and tribesman celebrate with joy and excitement.
The scene of racing camels spinning in Al Wathba racetrack in Abu Dhabi
Emirate is mirrored by a luxury car draped with the name of the donating company
spinning on its own large electric tray adjacent to the finish line. Not too far
from this first prize can be seen huge mural like portraits of the seven rulers
of the seven emirates, with President Shaikh Zayed in the centre. This scene
represent a perfect fusion of the local and global forces involved, with the
racing camels representing the traditional and local while the car represents
the modem and global, reflecting the complexity of the enterprise of reinventing
tradition and reproducing culture. It also tells us something about the dynamics
of traditions in changing societies.
Modem market and cultural traditions are evident in the context of camel
racing which appears of mutual benefit and support, in which the sales and
popularity of four-wheel drive farm work pickup trucks and four-wheel drive
luxury cruisers are positively affected by this passionate revival of racing
camels. Simultaneously, however, the effect of market global forces on this
cultural sport has, in a sense, commoditized a cultural tradition. Some
informants view modem camel racing as not having the real old authentic style
and fun. It has become captive to too many market and money concerns, as well as
too much media awareness. One informant noted, "It is now perhaps not any
different from powerboat racing."
Camel racing has become one of the attractions for European tourists coming
to spend winter holidays in the delightful mild UAE winter. Most of Dubai's
five-star hotels have camel racing on their guided tours for guests; in fact
some run special buses bringing large numbers of German, Swiss, and English
tourists to see this exotic authentic culture on the run. The expanding tourist
and hotel industry in the emirates, particularly in Dubai, has brought about an
interesting cultural irony where global international chain hotels advertise
camel safaris to their guests. "Come ride the real Arabia."8 One, indeed, wonders how real
and authentic this Arabia is when it is produced by global institutions of
commercial hospitality as a commodity for visiting consumers. The
commoditization of camel culture within global market forces transforms real
camel "folklore" into constructed "folklure."
The state has played a major role in supporting camel racing as one area in
the revival and preservation of al turath al sha'abi al asil (popular
authentic heritage), manifested through various levels of institutions and
agencies. They employ hundreds of mudhamers with frequent handsome gifts of
racing camels given to the Bedu. The shaikhs' gestures of not taking the car
prizes if their own camels win, but rather offering them to the mudhamer in
charge, reflect their genuine identification in the revival of heritage among
the population.
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The politico-cultural aspects of the camel racing phenomenon manifest
themselves through multiple intricate images, representations, and discourses.
While a detailed ethnography of all of these representational facets calls for a
separate paper, I feel that some brief notes on these aspects are required here
if only to complement the larger composite piece of this phenomenon.
Eric Davis' distinction between the notions of "statecraft and state
formation" is useful here within the context of changing U AE society.
According to Davis (1991: 12): Statecraft applies to the processes or
mechanisms whereby a state enhances its power and authority. Put differently,
statecraft entails the skills whereby political elites or ruling classes promote
state formation. The notion of statecraft allows us to infuse the concept of
state formation with a dynamic element. The important question is how groups
that control the state are able to widen its legitimacy base and subsequently
increase its strength. While our extensive ethnographic notes on the emergence
and evolution of camel racing represent a general answer to this question,
further notes which relate directly to the dynamic relationship between politics
and culture are required here.
The politico-cultural aspects of heritage revival are perhaps the most
celebrated in public media. Newspaper and television messages frequently
repeated throughout the racing season have acquired more or less a formulaic
pattern. The messages simultaneously embody political and cultural signifiers. A
typical newspaper message will read as follows: "Within the framework of
the directives of His Highness Shaikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, The President
of the State, and His Highness Shaikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, The Crown
Prince... and because of their Highnesses' concern for the revival of our
authentic popular heritage (ihyaa' al turath al sha'bi), the preservation
of our fathers' and ancestors' sport, and the protection of our authentic Arab
customs and traditions, camel races were organized under the patronage of His
Highness Shaikh Zayed, the President of the State."9
Photographs of the shaikhs present during particular
racing festivals will often appear alongside such statements.
The structure of these media statements can be broken down into various
interconnected politico-cultural components. First, comes a mention of the name
of His Highness Shaikh Zayed, The President of the State, as "the supreme
patron" of heritage revival in the country. Second, there is mention of
other shaikhs who are patronizing and attending race festivals in their own
particular emirate. This reflects the political hierarchical order within the
total power and authority structure in UAE political society. Third, a mention
of the cultural contribution realized by the shaikhs' attendance and their
support for these races. Fourth, a statement on the great cultural value and
function of these races for the preservation of national authentic culture.
Fifth, in some of these new items also appears the importance of pan-Arabian
Gulf cultural political ideology in which the camel stands as a basic cultural
theme, in Opler's sense of the term. 10
Within the context of a rapidly changing society empowered by its immense oil
wealth and unabated utilization of skills and services of a large expatriate
foreign work force, camel races as cultural performances provide a cultural link
between the modem changing society and the old cultural lifeways. Both ruling
shaikhs as well as citizens are always eager to express the view that camel
races are useful for the young generation to learn about how their ancestors
lived and how they struggled in their former way of life. In a television
interview with the President, Shaikh Zayed, in 1996 he remarked that "this
know ledge about the past enhances the citizen's concern and attachment to his
watan [homeland]." People should know the government's position in
supporting people working to promote our heritage. This knowledge should be an
inspiration for us, and for future generations to safeguard our homeland."
The ingredients of political culture relating to the function of camel racing
functioning as an ideological link, and inspiration for patriotic commitment to
the national homeland, and the embodiment of values and norms necessary for
cultural political socialization of younger generations are frequently repeated
in media messages.
The oil economy has intensified UAE integration within the global market.
Along with this has come global culture represented, in Appadurai's terms, by
multiple "scapes" such as: ethnoscapes, mediascapes, technoscapes,
financescapes, and ideoscapes (Appadurai 1990: 296). One may add other scapes
like servicescapes and militaryscapes. These scapes are basically globalizing
forces, which have literally created new dynamic and social reality in the
emirates, so much so that locals nowadays feel that their traditional national
identity is seriously under threat (Heard-Bey 1997). For example, in terms of
the dynamics of ethnoscapes alone the UAE society has now, relative to the size
of its own indigenous national workers, huge numbers of immigrant population
coming from diverse ethnic, national, religious, and cultural backgrounds. The
newly created population reality in the UAE is alarming to many nationals as
they now represent only a small minority in their own homeland, less than 15-20%
of the total population (Al Mur 1997). In this changing sociocultural and
economic context the nationals are manifesting in different discourses that
their local national culture is threatened; they perceive it to be under siege
(Al Mur 1997). The flows of the global world are strong and permeate through all
facets and cracks of the old cultural lifeways. It is within these shifting
cultural contexts, worldviews and unstable psychocultural parameters that
heritage revival becomes significant in sociological terms for the local culture
to reaffirm, so to speak, basic old cultural themes, in this case, revolving
around the camel. Camel racing festivals have become a social/cultural theater
for the regeneration and affirmation of cultural identity. As the media informs
us, they have become a way to preserve cultural 'asla (authenticity) and keep
cultural roots with the past well nourished and cared for. Camel racing
festivals are not only produced nowadays to please camel breeders and fleeting
tourists but most importantly they become in the current shifting multicultural
contexts a way of identifying cultural self vis-à-vis the other, particularly
when this other is overwhelming one's immediate social and cultural space.
The production of cultural aesthetics is not only confined to the scenes of
lean camels running in spectacular ways but is also found in the poetic language
that is delivered during such festive occasions. The camel arena during the
final races of the season turns into a platform for Bedu poets to recite their
poems of praise to their shaikhs. The media's systematic use of the Bedu
tradition has become an integral part of camel racing as a cultural performance.
A detailed expose of such cultural poetics lies outside the parameters of this
paper; nonetheless, it is important to note here that poems of camel racing as a
traditional form of communication are important in the making and projection of
positive images of current national leaders in the UAE. They are invoked as
patrons of heritage revival, and as the all-generous and all-caring fathers of
their respective people. Excerpts of a long poem presented in the final races in
April 1996, as a salute honoring Shaikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum of Dubai,
give us a feel for this type of political praise poetry.
In haste I write brief representations.
Only the precious poem pearls I give.
The poor of my poems I discard.
Ye supporter of the weak, the neighbor and brotherly men.
Ye Shaikh of Shaikhs who deserve praise.
The white banner of honor is yours.
For him history registers lofty deeds.
His goodness like rain spreads benefits near and far. Isn't it a delight we
celebrate the hejin spectacle.
These hejin deeds are crowned with glory.
Mohammed Al Maktoum, defender of the homeland. Its glory he has raised.
He designed its racetracks.
Widened its urban scapes.
It has become, as often said, a swinging paradise.
The ruling groups in control of the state in the UAE appear not to hide the
political rationale behind their support for heritage revival. The economic and
cultural rationales are clearly expressed and are frequently emphasized
publicly. The systematic attention given to popular culture, and the
institutional construction and invocation of historical memory through common
references to past roots, authentic heritage, purity and nobleness of the race
camels, etc. all demand from the state, to borrow Davis' words, "an ability
to reconstruct, synthesize, and even invent symbols that will touch a
psychological nerve in the populace at large. A strong state is one that can
exercise this craft and that continues to forge emotive links with the populace
over which it rules." (1991: 13).
It should be remembered that large racetrack complexes represent in
themselves important institutional state projects. They forge, so to speak, big
impressions that the oil state, as the modernizing agent par excellence, is
eager to produce and manage. As has been ethnographically illustrated, this is a
costly business, yet the political dividends earned and directed to strengthen
the state are equally high, particularly as this carries great political value
as in the new oil states of the Gulf real power is still expressed outside the
official state institutions. The massive contribution of the ruling shaikhly
elite to local heritage revival and popular culture aims to affect the citizens'
political perception of their state. This perception now views this state as a
performer, or an embodiment of two vital roles: as a super modernizing agent as
well as the guardian of traditional national heritage and cultural identity
which manifests itself, among other things, in the now institutionalized annual
hejin races.
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Camel races as part of a larger phenomenon of heritage revival have been
produced over the last two decades under the shadow of globalization processes.
Perhaps, as Robertson (1995) would argue, the revival and modern development of
these races has occurred because of globalization. The complex process of
producing such evolving traditional cultural sports has generated a number of
social facts and cultural forms some of which are manifested in cultural ironies
and paradoxes. The first cultural irony relates to the fact that the
revitalization of "traditional local camel culture" in the changing
societies of Arabia has required the assistance of "modern global
commodities": oil, the car, and the television, each generating its own
cultural dynamics and thus reshaping the production of camel culture. For
present-day camel breeders, "she has won a car" has become the
often-stated measure for affirming the high value and superior qualities of a
race camel. Here we need to return to the images projected on television screens
of camels running and prize cars spinning simultaneously on the same grounds of
the racetrack.
This leads to further irony related to the commercialization of camel
traditions. This is due to the new economic and commercial lure created by the
shaikhs' financial support, the local car agents and businessmen who function as
interlocutors within the global car industries and local markets as well as the
prevailing high consumerism in the society. This commercialized aspect of
reproducing traditional culture is of primary importance as it sustains the
continuation of camel races to generate at another level "cultural
theater" and "ideological discourse," both necessary for the
creation of an ideological dimension within the larger processes of state
formation of the UAE as a new and modern nation-state. This point alerts us to
the analytical significance of cultural economy in present-day globalized oil
Gulf society.
The third paradox relates to the politico-cultural discourse that emphasizes
the great cultural roles performed by the local people and their ruling elite
groups, at the expense of marginalizing contributions from the global actors and
forces that are actually involved in every stage of the organization and
production processes of the races. Here, as examples, we refer to the Balochi
shepherd, the Somali camel jockey, the Australian breeding scientist, and the
Dutch camel nutritionist, as well as others who represent the various scapes
which Appadurai (1990) identified as constituting the global scene. This can be
explained by the fact that we are dealing here with a small society (only 2.3
million at the end of 1994) where national citizens themselves are only a small
minority of less than 20% of this total population. 11
This population imbalance expresses itself among the
local nationals in having "under siege psychology," as they feel and
often express that their local culture is being seriously threatened by forces
of foreign cultures (Al Mur 1997; Heard-Bey 1997). It is, therefore, not
surprising that the cultural discourse on heritage, as' expressed in the UAE
press and television should highlight and glorify the role of the national
segments of the total population in the production of such cultural revivals.
This brings us to the fourth fact that relates to the fusion of the social
and politico-ideological elements in the construction of the races as national
cultural performances. The ethnographic material presented in this research
topic illustrates the fact that the core activities in camel racing revolve
around tile traditional tribal components and aspects that are still visible in
U AE modernizing society. Equally significant, the revival of Bedu traditions in
this changing society maintains an important traditional and conservative
anchorage to the entire politico-ideological system in the society. This fact is
functionally congruent with the very nature of the existing type of traditional
patrimonial dynastic authority structure in the oil rich states. The Bedu in the
UAE and the wider Gulf societies are known to be conservative and most loyal to
the existing traditional shaikhly political system. Subsequently the revival and
modernization of their camel related traditions are meant among other things to
celebrate, through created annual institutional forms, elements of cultural
continuity and conservatism in a society threatened by its own pace and modality
of change which are strongly linked to wide currents and flows of global
culture.
Television coverage of Bedouin poetry and traditions related to the camel
achieves this goal by delimiting the boundaries and identifying symbols of the
nationals' social and cultural image. It should be added that the race festivals
provide the state apparatus, through its control of modem media, sufficient
fodder from which it is deriving significant components of its national
ideological discourse. Equally significant the political voice of pan-Arabian
Gulf countries (the Gulf Cooperation Council countries) is also heard during the
festivities of the races. This is also celebrated in the frequent presence of
high-ranking dignitaries from the ruling families of other Gulf states.
The fifth note relates to the fact that production of camel races as cultural
festivals as documented involves people and groups of different nationalities
and social positions: shaikhs, wealthy merchants, tribesmen, foreign
professional experts, and foreign camel laborers. In view of this sociological
fact one could ask if there is no class contradiction in this total process of
cultural enterprise? I believe that the absence of discussion on class and/or
ideological contradictions does not create here an analytical gap. Briefly
stated, certain important facts and factors, all have helped to repress, as it
were, the emergence of contradictions and tensions along class lines. These
include the capacity of the oil state to lavish its wealth onto its small
national population, the generous institutionalized financial and moral support
given to camels and race festivals, the huge often temporary presence of
expatriate labor force, the nationals' perception of their local culture as
being under siege, thus reinforcing among them the "in-group" psycho
political values and sentiments, the very short historical experience of oil
wealth and modernization and the generalized anxieties towards the overshadowing
global forces. Besides, the notion of statecraft suggests that state supported
cultural festivities are, after all, meant to celebrate, in the Gramscian sense
of the term, the solidity of cultural and national identity. This function
becomes more urgent and compelling particularly when this national culture in
question is being constructed within wide shifting multicultural forces and
contexts which threaten to dilute it and fragment it into different directions.
At a general level of discourse our total ethnographic description on the
evolution of camel racing illustrate very well Gramsci's notion of the delicate
utilization of culture in its varied domains and forms as part and parcel of the
state repertoire and armor in building its ideological ascendancy and promoting
further its legitimacy and success for state formation. 12
It remains, however, relevant to note here that there are areas of relative
economic exploitation affecting foreign laborers employed in camel farms. This
fact is not found only in the enterprise of camel racing but is rather common
with regard to all non-skilled expatriate laborers throughout the Gulf. In
relation to this fact, incomes earned by such laborers represent, as they often
express, a God-given opportunity to earn a living and support their families
back home where deteriorating harsh economic realities are driving them away by
the thousands.
As a final note the evolution of camel racing as a national cultural
enterprise represents a complex multidimensional phenomenon. While society is
utilizing in the production of this phenomenon modern global
"homogenizing" cultural flows, agencies, technologies, and
commodities, it aims at empowering its "particularizing" and
relativizing traditional cultural sense of identity. This remains the stated
objective even though what is being produced on the stage now has become
different from the old authentic camel culture of yesterday.
My profound gratitude and thanks go to the United Arab Emirates University
for funding this research that was conducted during 1996-98 racing seasons. Many
informants were particularly generous with their time and help. Here I would
like to offer my special thanks to Mohammed Said and Mohammed Said Al Hilli,
both from Dubai, Dr. Ulrich Wernery, Director of the Central Veterinary Research
Laboratory in Dubai. There were scores of other informants from the Emirates,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and expatriate professionals and laborers like
Australians, Pakistanis, Afghanis, Sudanese, Somalis, Bangladeshis, whose
generosity and appreciation of my research made it possible to complete this
research and collect a wealth of ethnographic data which go beyond the scope of
this particular paper.
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1 The fieldwork for this research was conducted during the
camel racing seasons over the last three years (1996- 98). The research involved
field visits to racing tracks in the United Arab Emirates, visiting numerous
camel farms, conducting lengthy interviews with those involved in the production
and organization of the races such as Bedu breeders, trainers, personnel of the
Camel Racing Association, and expatriate camel farm laborers and other
professionals working in the camel clinics and veterinary research centres. The
many hours spent watching and recording camel races and camel-related television
cultural programs came to be very useful for this research. One of the most
enjoyable aspects of this research was visiting camel owners while camping in
their tents on the outskirts of racetracks. They came primarily from Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE itself. They were hospitable and always ready
to invite me in to share coffee and tea with them. Most of the time I found them
willing and excited to talk about their newly developing business of camel
breeding and camel racing. The coffee drinking often led to sharing late
breakfasts or lunch with them. Return to text
2 On Julian Steward's theoretical conceptualization of
"cultural ecology" see Robert Netting 1986: 6. Also see Haviland 1981:
170. Return to text
3 In the Lisan Al-Arab Lexicon the word hejin means
"inter-breeds." It also means a woman or a camel that comes from noble
stock. Al-hejin in camels refers to the white as well as to the superior quality
types. See Al-Iman Abi Al-Fadl n.d.: 431-434. Return to
text
4 While officially the races start at the beginning of
September, because of the heat they do not gain momentum until October each
year. Return to text
5 Camel Racing Association rules were published 1993 in
Abu Dhabi, UAE Return to text
6 See final camel races program booklet, Dubai, March 1998:
3 Return to text
7 In this statement we hear an echo of Malinowski's
Trobriand voices (9184 [1922] who claimed that once one gets into the "kula
ring" system of exchange he cannot get out of it. The multiplexity of
relationships and benefits involved in each of these two "rings" are
quite similar. Thus the force of continuing involvement on the part of
participating actors. Return to text
8 An advertisement leaflet published by the Hilton Hotel
in Al Ain City in 1997. Return to text
9 Al Itihad Newspaper, 22 April 1996: 3. Return to text
10 For a brief expose of Opler's notion of "basic
cultural themes" see Fred Voget (1975: 421-425). Return
to text
11 Ministry of Planning Report of the end of the 1994
population census. Published in Al Bayan Newspaper, 30 September 1995: 3. Return to text
12 For detailed writings on Gramsci's political ideas on
popular culture ideology and state hegemony, see the works published by Joseph
Femia (1987) and David Forgacs (1988). Return to text
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